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ALL TOGETHER NOW:  USING PRINCIPLES OF GROUP
DYNAMICS TO TRAIN BETTER JURORS
SARA GORDON*
ABSTRACT
We ask juries to make important decisions that have a profound impact on
people’s lives.  We leave these decisions in the hands of groups of laypeople
because we hope that the diverse range of experiences and knowledge in the
group will lead to more thoughtful and informed decisionmaking.   Studies1
suggest that diverse groups of jurors have different perspectives on evidence,
engage in more thorough debate, and more closely evaluate facts.   At the same2
time, there are a variety of problems associated with group decisionmaking, from
the loss of individual motivation in group settings, to the vulnerability of groups,
to various cognitive biases and errors.   Moreover, jurors are often at a3
disadvantage because most of them have never served on a jury and many of
them have never worked with a group to reach a decision about a complex
problem.   Compounding these issues, jurors are not typically given instructions4
or training on working in a group or on effective decisionmaking strategies. 
Although there is extensive literature examining juries and jury deliberations,
this Article is the first to consider all of the major scientific studies that examine
training in group decisionmaking and apply them to jury decisionmaking.  Many
studies have examined group processes and group deliberations in the fields of
social psychology, organizational psychology, business administration,
advertising, and a variety of related areas.   Moreover, countless studies examine5
group decisionmaking and recommend the use of training to improve group
performance.   Yet almost none of this interdisciplinary knowledge of group6
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1. David D. Henningsen et al., Role of Social Loafing in Predeliberation Decision Making,
4 GROUP DYNAMICS:  THEORY, RES., & PRACTICE 168 (2000).
2. NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES 74 (2007).
3. Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment:  Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103
PSYCHOL. REV. 687, 713 (1996).
4. Henningsen et al., supra note 1. 
5. J. Richard Hackman, Learning More By Crossing Levels:  Evidence From Airplanes,
Hospitals, and Orchestras, 24 J. ORG. BEHAV. 905 (2003); Steven A. Murphy & Michael L.
McIntyre, Board of Director Performance:  A Group Dynamics Perspective, 7 CORP. GOVERNANCE
209, 213 (2007); Gwen M. Wittenbaum & Richard L. Moreland, Small-Group Research in Social
Psychology:  Topics and Trends over Time, 2 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 187, 187
(2008). 
6. Herman Aguinis & Kurt Kraiger, Benefits of Training and Development for Individuals
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dynamics and the efficacy of training on group performance has been applied to
one of the most fundamental group decisionmaking bodies—the jury.  We can
use this literature to create effective juror training procedures and give jurors
strategies to more effectively deliberate and reach better group decisions.
“Gettin’ good players is easy.  Gettin’ ‘em to play together is the hard part.”
–Casey Stengel7
INTRODUCTION
On a college campus, student volunteers were interviewed to discuss “some
of the problems involved in life at an urban university.”   Some of the volunteers8
completed the written interview questions alone in a room, while others
completed the questions in groups of three.   As they were answering questions,9
smoke started to drift through a wall vent.   When alone in the room, it took an10
average of two minutes for the volunteers to stop answering questions and report
the smoke and seventy-five percent of them reported the smoke before six
minutes had elapsed.   When in groups, only one of the twenty-four volunteers11
reported the smoke within the first four minutes “before the room got noticeably
unpleasant,” and only three reported the smoke before the six-minute
experimental period elapsed.   The other volunteers “stayed in the waiting room12
as it filled up with smoke, doggedly working on their questionnaires and waving
the fumes away from their faces.   They coughed, rubbed their eyes, and opened13
the window—but they did not report the smoke.”14
When asked about the smoke later on, those who had reported the smoke
recalled that they thought the smoke was “strange,” and while they were not sure
if it was dangerous, they generally thought it was “a good idea to check it out.”  15
and Teams, Organizations, and Society, 60 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 451, 452-53 (2009).
7. RONALD ADLER ET AL., COMMUNICATING AT WORK:  PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES FOR
BUSINESS AND THE PROFESSIONS 235 (10th ed. 2009).
8. Bibb Latané & John M. Darley, Group Inhibition of Bystander Intervention in
Emergencies, 10 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 215, 217 (1960).
9. Id.
10. Id.  The smoke was produced by passing air through a container of titanium tetrachloride,
which created a “clearly visible stream of whitish smoke.”  Id.
11. Id.  “Soon, most subjects would get up from their chairs, walk over to the vent, and
investigate it closely, sniffing the smoke, waving their hands in it, feeling its temperature, etc.  The
usual alone subject would hesitate again, but finally walk out of the room, look around outside, and
finding somebody there, calmly report the presence of smoke.”  Id.
12. Id. at 218.  In a another condition consisting of one participant and two confederates, only
one of ten people reported the smoke; the other nine stayed in the smoky room until the six-minute
experimental period ended.  Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 219.  Specifically, the authors describe the experimental procedure this way:  After
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In contrast, those who had not reported the smoke had a variety of explanations,
none of which involved anything dangerous—some thought it was steam or air-
conditioning vapors, some thought it was smog, and some thought it might be a
“truth gas” designed to elicit honest responses to the questionnaire.   Almost all16
of the subjects denied that the presence of others in the room influenced their
decision not to report the smoke.  17
Like the groups of students in the smoky room, jurors must work in groups,
and what happens when jurors deliberate can be hard to know.  Most of the
information we have about what happens when juries deliberate in groups comes
from post-verdict interviews with jurors and accounts published by former
jurors.   Most studies of jury communication rely on mock juries, which may or18
may not provide an accurate representation of the actual deliberative process.  19
What we do know is that as many as thirty-three percent of jurors do not actively
participate in the deliberation process, and that twenty-five percent of mock jurors
do not speak at all during deliberations.   If almost a third of jurors are not20
actively contributing to group deliberations, the ideal of a representative jury has
not been realized.   Furthermore, we know from studies of group processes and21
group deliberations that all groups—including juries—are prone to a variety of
shortcomings, from loss of individual motivation in groups,  to various cognitive22
biases,  to the profound influence other members of the group have on individual23
six minutes, whether or not the subjects had reported the smoke, the interviewer stuck his head in
the waiting room and asked the subject to come with him to the interview.  After seating the subject
in his office, the interviewer made some general apologies about keeping the subject waiting for
so long, hoped the subject hadn’t become too bored and asked if he “had experienced any difficulty
while filling out the questionnaire.”  By this point most subjects mentioned the smoke.  The
interviewer expressed mild surprise and asked the subject to tell him what had happened.  Thus
each subject gave an account of what had gone through his mind during the smoke infusion.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 220.
18. See, e.g., Victoria Hekkers, Exorcising A Ghost:  My Experience as a Jury Foreperson,
13 CASE MANAGER 78 (2002).
19. For an excellent summary of various jury studies, see Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury
Decision Making:  45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 622 (2001).
20. Donna Shestowsky & Leonard M. Horowitz, How the Need for Cognition Scale Predicts
Behavior in Mock Jury Deliberations, 28 L. HUMAN BEHAVIOR 305, 305 (2004). 
21. Of course, a “representative jury pool” and a “seated jury” are not necessarily the same
thing.  Many citizens are called for jury service but are not selected.  See, e.g., Sean Michaels,
Madonna Dismissed from Jury Duty Without Hearing a Case, GUARDIAN (July 8, 2014, 2:31 PM),
http://alturl.com/3bxe8, archived at http://perma.cc/D6EG-P2ER.  Others actively attempt to avoid
service.  See, e.g., Jennifer Waters, Psst! You Want to Duck Jury Duty?, WALL ST. J. (May 8, 2011,
12:01 AM), http://alturl.com/e9rhg, archived at http://perma.cc/G4B6-AERK. 
22. See, e.g., Henningsen et al., supra note 1; see also infra Part III.B.
23. See, e.g., Kerr et al., supra note 3, at 713 (noting that “all other things being equal,
different group processes can produce dramatically different relative biases”); see also infra notes
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jurors’ cognition and behavior.   Finally, jurors, to whom the process of group24
work and jury service is mostly new, are given almost no training or instruction
in effective group work or decisionmaking strategies.25
So while it can be difficult to understand the inner-workings of a jury, many
studies have examined group processes and group dynamics in the fields of social
psychology,  organizational psychology,  business administration,  and a26 27 28
variety of related areas.   Studies of group performance are mixed:  some studies29
suggest that groups generally perform better than individuals, while others do not
support this finding.   Of course, many domains, like the workplace or the30
military, require groups of individuals to work together and countless studies
recommend the use of training to improve group performance.   Yet very little31
321-22.
24. SUSAN T. FISKE, SOCIAL BEINGS:  CORE MOTIVES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 461 (John
Wiley & Sons eds., 1st ed. 2004); see also infra Part III.A.
25. See, e.g., 1.1 DUTY OF JURY NINTH CIRCUIT MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (2007)
(giving instruction on the law, but not on effective group work or decisionmaking strategies).
26. See, e.g., Wittenbaum & Moreland, supra note 5, at 187 (noting that “research on small
groups has a long history within social psychology”).
27. See, e.g., Hackman, supra note 5 (advocating for a robust understanding of social and
organizational dynamics when studying group behavior because “it makes sense to strip away the
context to see how things really work only when the context is not itself a key part of how things
do work—which, in group and organizational studies, it usually is”); see also Richard T. Mowday,
Organizational Behavior:  Linking Individuals and Groups to Organizational Contexts, 44 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 195 (1993).
28. See, e.g., Murphy & McIntyre, supra note 5, at 213 (2007) (noting that “internal group
dynamics within a board [have] been neglected in traditional studies linking single boards of
directors characteristics to firm performance.”).
29. One of the earliest definitions of the study of group dynamics described it as a “field of
inquiry dedicated to advancing knowledge about the nature of groups, the laws of their
development, and their interrelations with individuals, other groups, and larger institutions.” 
DORWIN CARTWRIGHT & ALVIN ZANDER, EDS., GROUP DYNAMICS:  RESEARCH AND THEORY 7 (3d
ed. 1968).
30. See Bernard A. Nijstad & Silvia C. Kaps, Taking the Easy Way Out:  Preference
Diversity, Decision Strategies, and Decision Refusal in Groups, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 860, 860 (2008) (noting that “groups have the potential to outperform individuals when
it comes to the quality of decisions”);  but see Kerr et al., supra note 3, at 713 (noting that “there
was no simple empirical answer to this question”).
31. It is worth noting that while much of the research on training has been done in the context
of the workplace and job performance, these findings can and should be applied to juries.  One
could draw many analogies between an employee and a juror; both are paid for their time, are
instructed to obtain particular results, have a “supervisor,” and are expected to work with others in
groups.  As Aguinis and Kraiger note, “we take a point of view that training in work organizations
produces clear benefits for individuals and teams, organizations, and society.  We believe that
training in work organizations is an area of applied psychological research that is particularly well
suited for making a clear contribution to the enhancement of human well-being and performance
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of this interdisciplinary knowledge of training in effective group decisionmaking
has been applied to one of the most fundamental group decisionmaking
bodies—the jury.  And while many empirical studies have found that jurors are
competent decisionmakers,  often reaching the same or similar decisions as32
judges, some additional training could be enormously helpful in assisting jurors
to overcome many of the challenges all groups face in coming to decisions.  We
can and should use this literature to inform our understanding of the optimal
functioning of the jury, to provide jurors with strategies for working in groups,
and to improve jury deliberation and decisionmaking. 
Specifically, jurors would benefit tremendously from additional training in
group decisionmaking strategies and effective group collaboration.  Jury
instructions that simply tell jurors to “reach an agreement” on the evidence  do33
not provide jurors with the tools and strategies they need to thoughtfully and
efficiently analyze the facts and law they learn during the trial.  Specific
decisionmaking strategies would allow jurors to spend more time analyzing the
information and law they have heard about in a trial and less time simply figuring
out how to approach the information.  Additionally, jurors should be trained in
information sharing, which will ensure that the group discusses all relevant
evidence.  This can also help reduce group conformity and encourage individual
jurors to mention and discuss minority views.  This information sharing will help
further achieve the goal of a truly diverse decisionmaking body.  Finally, jurors
should be trained in effective decisionmaking procedure, including the selection
of the foreperson.  This will help encourage more thoughtful evaluation of the
evidence and help reduce the impact of status hierarchies and social conformity
on group decisionmaking. 
Part I of this Article discusses the development of the American jury system
and specifically the development of the modern jury as a group decisionmaking
body.  Part II of this Article explores the concept of a “group,” a term with
various definitions, but a profound impact on the behavior and decisionmaking
of its members.  This part also explores the development and life-cycles of a
group, including status hierarchies, group cohesion, group norms, and roles.  Part
III discusses the profound influence groups have over their members, including
the individual tendency to conform to the group, as well as various motivation
losses that occur within a group, like social loafing and free-riding.  Part IV
recommends more intensive training in decisionmaking, information-sharing, and
jury procedure as a way to improve group decisionmaking and encourage jurors
to make more careful and accurate evaluations of the law and evidence before
reaching a verdict. 
in organizational and work settings as well as in society in general.”  Aguinis & Kraiger, supra note
6, at 452-53.
32. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges:  A Benchmark
for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 470, 470 (2005).
33. 3.1 DUTY TO DELIBERATE, NINTH CIRCUIT MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (2007).
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I.  A  JURY OF PEERS:  FROM TRIAL BY ORDEAL TO GROUP DECISIONMAKING
As a society, we must have a way to handle crimes, disagreements, and
disputes, and while the jury system has a long history dating back to the Magna
Carta,  it is in fact predated by many other dispute resolution processes.  During34
the Middle Ages, disputes were settled by methods like trial by wager of battle,
in which “the two disputing parties engaged in a formal duel under the
assumption that God would determine which party was in the right and should
prevail,”  and trial by ordeal, in which people were submerged in cold water35
(those who sunk to the bottom were innocent, while those who rose to the top
were guilty) or burned with hot irons (“festering after three days was a sign of
guilt”).   In 1215, Catholic priests, who had played a large part in these various36
trial procedures, were forbidden from participating, and these and similar
procedures came to an end.   In their place, we began to see the slow and uneven37
development of decisions by groups of jurors throughout the British Empire and
in all of the American colonies.38
Early American jury trials similarly bore little resemblance to the process we
see today.  English Puritans in the colonies instructed jurors to “Feare God and39
Keepe his Commandments,” and individual colonies created jury systems based
in part on their individual cultural and religious beliefs.   Moreover, these early40
juries were composed entirely of men, and jury service was typically limited to
landowners.   But as the country continued to change, the jury system also41
34. The Magna Carta required that charges against barons should be heard by other barons,
their “peers,” rather than by the king.  VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 2, at 66. 
35. Id. at 22; see also GEORGE R.R. MARTIN, A GAME OF THRONES 421 (1996) (Tyrion
Lannister noted, “The gods know the truth of my innocence.  I will have their verdict, not the
judgment of men.  I demand trial by combat.”).  Tyrion found himself in this unenviable position
more than once:  “I am innocent, but I will get no justice here.  You leave me no choice but to
appeal to the gods.  I demand trial by battle.”  GEORGE R.R. MARTIN, A STORM OF SWORDS 963
(2000).
36. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 2, at 22.
37. Id. at 23.  As Vidmar & Hans note, even at the time of its use, the inadequacies of trial
by ordeal “as a method of proof were apparent to many members of the Church.” Id.
38. Id. at 24, 36 (noting that the 1606 charter to the Virginia Company provided for jury trial,
and by 1624 juries were available for all civil and criminal cases.  In 1623, the right to a jury trial
was recognized in New Plymouth.  The Massachusetts Bay Colony introduced jury trials in 1628. 
The Colony of West New Jersey formally recognized them in 1677, as did Pennsylvania in 1682. 
In fact, juries were probably in use before their formal recognition.  Rhode Island had jury trials
even before the establishment of the colony’s government and set of laws in 1647.).
39. Id. at 47.  “The seeds of the jury system may have been in existence in the form of proof
by witnesses before William the Conqueror defeated King Harold’s army in 1066, but the Norman
conquest of England set the stage for a more formal use of sworn testimony.”  Id. at 23.  
40. Id. at 48.
41. JAMES C. OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY:  THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND ANGLO-AMERICAN
SPECIAL JURIES 176 (2006).
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evolved.  In the second half of the nineteenth century, defendants were given the
right to testify, lawyers began to have a bigger role in the process, and court
systems began to take form, with separate courts of appeals.   At the same time,42
trials were almost always short and not overly concerned with procedure.   Trials43
often took less than half an hour, and juries sometimes heard as many as six cases
in a day.   Nevertheless, the jury of peers—composed of groups of people from44
an accused’s community—began to take shape and the group decisionmaking
body became seen as a democratic ideal, one that promoted accurate fact-finding
and provided a check on the powers of the government.45
While rates of jury trials have declined in both criminal and civil cases in the
United States, the jury still plays an important role in the American justice
system.   And despite all of this change, one thing about the American jury46
system that has remained relatively constant since its inception is the ideal of a
representative jury with dual goals—a jury of peers that is composed of a
“reasonable cross-section” of the community.   The jury of peers is intended to47
give defendants a fair trial by including in the jury a representative number of
people who share his “cultural, linguistic, ethnic, or, possibly, socioeconomic
circumstances.”   Conversely, the reasonable cross-section requirement ensures48
that members of the jury are drawn from all segments of the community in which
the trial occurs.   As the United States Supreme Court has noted, “[p]roviding an49
accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable
safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant,
biased, or eccentric judge.”  50
42. For an excellent summary of the development of the modern jury system in the United
States, see VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 2, at 41-64.
43. Id. at 59.
44. Id. at 60.
45. RANDOLPH N. JONAKIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 36 (2003). 
46. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 2, at 60-61.  This decline can be attributed to a number of
factors, from the increasing use of dispute resolution, which has moved disputes from courts and
juries to mediators and negotiators, to plea bargaining, once unusual in the criminal system, which
reduces the number of criminal cases that go to trial.  Id. at 63.
47. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). 
48. OLDHAM, supra note 41, at 176-77.
49. Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220. 
50. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).  The term “American jury system”
includes many discrete systems.  Each state, the federal government, and the District of Columbia
has its own courts, laws, and practices, with multiple jury systems.  Moreover, jury systems differ
in criminal cases and civil matters.  All of these systems do share some important characteristics. 
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed[.]”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The United States
Supreme Court has limited this right by holding that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee jury
trials for “petty” offenses, or those carrying a potential punishment of less than six months’
imprisonment.  See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970).  Since 1968, this constitutional
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Of course, the representative jury is based on the premise that while
individual jurors may view the evidence through the lens of their past
experiences,  they must agree as a group on the legal implications of the51
evidence they have heard in order to reach a verdict.  They must reconcile their
individual perspectives and arrive at a group decision.   The process by which52
jurors reach a group decision and the characteristics of the deliberation process
began receiving attention in the legal literature starting in 1950 with the Chicago
Jury Project.   Since then, hundreds of studies have further explored juries and53
jury decisionmaking in mock jury experiments, as well as in interviews with real
jurors.   And there have been significant improvements in the process by which54
right to a jury trial has applied to both state and federal criminal trials.  Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155-56. 
In civil cases in federal court, the right to a jury trial is governed by the Seventh Amendment,
which provides that “[i]n Suits at Common Law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VII.  This
constitutional right to a jury trial in civil cases only applies to federal cases, but most states do
afford jury trials in civil matters for cases above the level of the small claims court.  See AMERICAN
JUDICATURE SOCIETY, RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL (2013), available at http://alturl.com/vmmgu, archived
at http://perma.cc/7863-LEFP.
51. The story model is the most prevalent theory on how individual jurors view and interpret
the facts they see in a trial.  In this model, jurors use instructions to derive lists of the features of
individual crimes or claims; if the story they have constructed shares enough features with the
instructions, they will find the defendant guilty, and if it is missing too many requirements, they
will find the defendant innocent.  REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 22-23 (1983); see also Peter
W. English & Bruce D. Sales, A Ceiling or Consistency Effect for the Comprehension of Jury
Instructions, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 381, 382 (1997).
52. In federal courts, juries must consist of at least six and no more than twelve members in
civil trials, and are normally composed of twelve jurors in criminal trials.  FED. R. CIV. P. 48(a);
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).  In civil cases in state court, size and unanimity requirements vary
considerably.  See THOMAS COHEN & RON MALEGA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTIC’S SURVEY OF
STATE COURT ORGANIZATIONS (2011), available at http://alturl.com/cxfxi, archived at
http://perma.cc/H5LL-CCQ6.  About half of states allow non-unanimous verdicts in civil cases, and
fewer than half require twelve-person juries.  Id.  For a recent report on size and unanimity
requirements in all jurisdictions.  Id.  In both civil and criminal cases in federal courts, the jury
must reach a unanimous verdict.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a); FED. R. CIV. P. 48(b).  In 1972, the United
States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous verdict in criminal
cases, but that this Sixth Amendment guarantee does not apply to state criminal courts by virtue of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406
(1972).  Today in state courts, only Louisiana and Oregon allow non-unanimous jury verdicts in
criminal cases and the United States Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in Jackson v.
Louisiana, a case that challenged the constitutionality of Louisiana’s law.  Jackson v. Louisiana,
134 S. Ct. 1950 (2014). 
53. For an excellent review of the University of Chicago Jury Project, see Valerie P. Hans
& Neil Vidmar, The American Jury at Twenty-Five Years, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 323, 324-26
(1991).
54. See Devine et al., supra note 19, at 622.
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jurors are asked to make decisions:  many courts have begun to pre-instruct jurors
on the applicable law before the introduction of evidence, and some courts allow
the jury to take notes, to submit questions to witnesses, and to consult written
copies of jury instructions during deliberations.  55
At the same time, there has been extensive research on group decisionmaking
in the social sciences.   Much of this research supports the idea that groups can56
be effective decisionmakers, often reaching equivalent or better decisions than
individuals could have on their own.   Some research suggests that representative57
juries composed of people with different backgrounds and experiences promote
accurate fact-finding because such a group is likely to hold diverse perspectives
on the evidence, engage in more thorough debate, and more closely evaluate the
facts.   On the other hand, there are also a variety of problems associated with58
group decisionmaking, from loss of motivation in groups due to social loafing
and the free-rider effect, to the vulnerability of groups, to various cognitive biases
and errors.   Group dynamics also play a role; it can be difficult for an individual59
to stand up to the group when her opinion is in the minority.   But despite this60
extensive literature, almost none of the insights gained from studies of group
dynamics and training in group decisionmaking has been applied to juries to
improve the process by which this important group deliberates and makes
decisions.
While judges and lawyers instruct jurors to decide only the facts, this
instruction assumes a clear division between the law and the facts, or that all
individual jurors will view the facts as they are.   But in fact, application of law61
to facts involves certain value judgments and “the deliberation provides an
excellent opportunity for the jury members to influence one another on the
55. See HON. GREGORY E. MIZE (RET.) ET AL., THE STATE-OF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF JURY
IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS:  A COMPENDIUM REPORT 36 (2007), available at http://alturl.com/egwby,
archived at http://perma.cc/ A9HF-WZRB.
56. For a recent review of studies related to group decisionmaking, see Norbert L. Kerr &
Scott Tindale, Group Performance And Decisionmaking, 55 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 623 (2004).
57. Nijstad & Kaps, supra note 30, at 860; see also Gregory S. Berns et al., Neurobiological
Correlates of Social Conformity and Independence During Mental Rotation, 58 BIOLOGICAL
PSYCHIATRY 245, 245 (2005).  For a discussion of the advantages of group decisionmaking in
corporate governance, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why A Board?  Group Decisionmaking in
Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002).
58. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 2, at 74.  As Vidmar and Hans note, the “idea of a
representative jury is a compelling one.  A jury of people with a wide range of backgrounds, life
experiences, and world knowledge will promote accurate fact-finding.”  Id.
59. Tatsuya Kameda et al., Democracy Under Uncertainty:  The Wisdom of Crowds and the
Free-Rider Problem in Group Decision Making, 118 PSYCHOL. REV. 76, 76-77 (2011).
60. Robert B. Cialdini & Noah J. Goldstein, Social Influence:  Compliance and Conformity,
55 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 591, 612 (2004) (noting that “the extent to which one identifies with a
message source—be it a majority or a minority—is a significant factor in determining the
information processing strategies one employs as well as the outcome of an influence attempt”).
61. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 2, at 144. 
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meaning of facts and the value judgments implicit within them.”   And as a62
group of individuals attempting to reach a collective decision, juries—like all
other human groups—are subject to common drawbacks of group
decisionmaking.  So while the representative jury is an improvement from the
time of trial by combat, studies of group dynamics and training in group
decisionmaking can inform that process and we should draw from the conclusions
of those studies to give individual jurors more guidance about how to avoid the
vulnerabilities associated with group decisionmaking and reach better decisions.
II.  WE ARE A SORT OF THEY:  HOW TO DEFINE A “GROUP”
“Father, Mother, and Me, Sister and Auntie say
All the people like us are We, and every one else is They.
And They live over the sea, While We live over the way,
But—would you believe it?—they look upon We
As only a sort of They!”
–Rudyard Kipling  63
When fish swim together they are a “school.”  When lions hunt collectively,
it is a “pride.”  When chimpanzees cooperate to defend fruit trees, they are a
“troop.”  And when two or more human beings “are connected by and within
social relationships,” they are a “group.”   To understand how groups make64
decisions and how we can train them to make better decisions, we first need to
understand what groups are and how they evolve, but the term “group” can be
difficult to define.   For some, the critical factor in defining a group is the65
experience of a common fate.   For others, group members must have some66
perception of themselves as members of the same social category.   What these67
varying descriptions all have in common is a collection of individuals who
“perceive themselves in terms of their group membership.”68
62. Id. 
63. RUDYARD KIPLING, WE AND THEY (1926).
64. DONELSON R. FORSYTH, GROUP DYNAMICS 3 (5th ed. 2010).
65. Id. (observing that theorists are not of one mind when it comes to defining the word
group.)
66. See, e.g., Chester A. Insko et al., Interindividual-Intergroup Discontinuity in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game:  How Common Fate, Proximity, and Similarity Affect Intergroup
Competition, 120 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 163, 169 (2013) (some examples of
groups with a  “common fate” include “a migrating flock of birds, a moving herd of buffalo,
parading soldiers, [and] a marching band . . . .”).
67. Colin Wayne Leach, Group-Level Self-Definition and Self-Investment:  A Hierarchical
(Multicomponent) Model of In-Group Identification, 95 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 144, 146
(2008) (noting that “in-group identification is indicated by a ‘depersonalized’ self-perception,
whereby individuals come to ‘self-stereotype’ themselves as similar to other members of their in-
group”).
68. Id. (emphasis in original).
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We can think of “groupness” as fitting along a continuum; whether a
collection of people becomes a group depends on whether they possess
entitativity, the perception of being a coherent whole or an entity.   Whether and69
to what extent individuals become a group depends on their similarity, common
fate, proximity, and ongoing interaction.   For example, people standing in line70
together are proximate to one another, but do not possess any other characteristics
of a group and probably do not consider themselves a group.  Conversely, a group
of people brought together to serve on a jury are similar to the extent they are all
jurors, share the common fate of reaching a verdict, are proximate to one another
in the courtroom and during deliberations, and have ongoing interaction for the
duration of the trial.  All of these factors encourage cohesion and social
integration, which in turn gives the individual jurors a sense of group
membership.71
Like other groups of people, jurors are motivated to belong to social groups;
they want to have strong and stable relationships with other people and form
these bonds easily.   In a famous study testing this idea, researchers at a summer72
camp in Robbers Cove, Oklahoma divided young campers into two groups.   The73
boys were previously unacquainted, but after a week of living with their assigned
group—the Rattlers or the Eagles—the groups formed intense team loyalties.  74
Membership in social groups can also have profound impacts on an individual’s
well being—both psychological and physical.   For example, in a study of stroke75
sufferers, the ability to maintain existing group memberships was as important to
69. Namkje Koudenburg et al., Conversational Flow and Entitativity:  The Role of Status,
53 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 350, 351 (2014) (noting that “[t]he concept of entitativity is an important
determinant of processes within and between groups”).
70. FISKE, supra note 24, at 461.
71. Id.  Of course, “groupness” also depends on context.  For example, people who live in
the United States would identify themselves as “Americans” when compared to a group of people
who live in a different country, but in many other contexts would not see themselves as similar to
others in that “group.”  Moreover, all of those people would further self-identify as a member of
many different ethnic, social, and cultural groups.
72. Id.; see also Donald F. Sacco et al., Reactions to Social Inclusion and Ostracism as a
Function of Perceived In-Group Similarity, 18 GROUP DYNAMICS:  THEORY, RES., & PRAC. 129,
130 (2014) (observing that “unfulfilled belongingness needs have a decidedly negative impact on
well-being”).
73. MUZAFER SHERIF ET AL., THE ROBBERS CAVE EXPERIMENT, INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND
COOPERATION 94-95 (1988). 
74. Id. 
75. S. Alexander Haslam et al., Social Identity, Health and Well-Being:  An Emerging
Agenda for Applied Psychology, 58 APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1, 2-3 (2009) (explaining that “[g]roups are
not simply external features of the world that provide a setting for our behaviour.  Instead they
shape our psychology through their capacity to be internalised and contribute to our sense of self. 
Thus, far from being ‘just another’ factor that impinges upon the health of individuals, social
identities—and the notions of ‘us-ness’ that they both embody and help create—are central to
health and well-being.”).
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recovery as the ability to overcome cognitive difficulties with memory and
language.   Similarly, a study of nursing home residents found that a strong sense76
of identity associated with perceived membership in social groups was a much
better predictor of the residents’ well-being than their level of dementia.77
Once people are part of a group, they are powerfully influenced by other
group members.  In the smoke study, for example, the lack of reaction from
others in the room influenced the participants to believe that the smoke was not
serious and they therefore did not need to report it.   As the researchers noted,78
individuals were “likely to look at the reactions of people around [themselves]
and be powerfully influenced by them.”   Other researchers put forth different79
theories to explain this “bystander effect.”   For example, studies of diffusion of80
responsibility suggest that as the number of people in a group increases, each
individual member will be less responsible for helping because others will take
responsibility.   Both of these theories focus on the situation and how the81
presence of others in a situation motivates individual behavior.
Furthermore, belonging to a group has such a strong impact on individual
cognition and behavior that even people who only imagine being in a group have
concepts of unaccountability triggered.  These feelings of unaccountability can
cause group members to decide the situation does not call for their individual
assistance.   This sense of unaccountability occurs because “part of the concept82
of being in a group is the notion of being lost in a crowd, being deindividuated,
and having a lowered sense of personal accountability.”   For example, people83
who were asked to imagine that they won a dinner for themselves and thirty
friends subsequently pledged less to charity than those who imagined winning a
dinner for a group of ten people, while those who imagined a dinner with only
one friend pledged more than either of the larger groups.   Similarly, when84
people were asked to imagine being with a friend in a crowded movie theater, or
to imagine being with a friend in an empty movie theater, those who imagined a
crowded theater pledged significantly less to an annual giving campaign (on
76. Catherine Haslam et al., Maintaining Group Memberships:  Social Identity Continuity
Predicts Well-Being After Stroke, 18 NEUROPSYCHOL. REHABILITATION 671, 684 (2008).
77. Catherine Haslam et al., The Social Treatment:  The Benefits of Group Interventions in
Residential Care Settings, 25 PSYCHOL. & AGING 157, 163 (2010).
78. Latané & Darley, supra note 8, at 220.
79. Id. 
80. Id.  
81. Id. at 215 (noting “[i]f an individual is alone when he notices an emergency, he is solely
responsible for coping with it.  If he believes others are also present, he may feel that his own
responsibility for taking action is lessened, making him less likely to help”).
82. Stephen M. Garcia et al., Crowded Minds:  The Implicit Bystander Effect, 83 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 843, 851 (2002).
83. Id. at 845.
84. Id. at 846.  Subjects who imagined groups of thirty pledged an average of 3.6% of their
after-tax earnings, subjects who imagined groups of ten pledged an average of 3.9%, and subjects
who imagined dinner with one friend pledged an average of 4.2%.  Id.
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average between $100 and $249) than those who imagined being in an empty
theater (on average between $500 and $999).   It seems that simply imagining85
the presence of others influences behavior and can lead to lessened levels of
responsibility.86
Being a member of a group can therefore have a profound impact on an
individual’s cognition and behavior.  But the process of becoming a group takes
place in stages.  Just as individuals grow and develop through predictable stages,
so do groups of jurors.  As one author noted, “[g]roups are not static; nor do they
emerge, like the mythical Athena, fully formed in an act of divine creation.”  87
Throughout the life cycle of the group, individual jurors must establish and
maintain relationships with other members of the jury.   Various changes occur88
within the jury from the time it is empanelled to the time it reaches a verdict,
including the evolution of status hierarchies, group cohesion, group norms, and
group roles.  We can examine these stages to get a better sense of how group
membership influences individual jurors’ decisionmaking and the decisionmaking
of the jury as a whole.
A.  Status
Many species, from humans to birds, fish, and insects quickly form status
hierarchies when placed in a group setting.   In humans, the status level of89
various group members can be seen in both non-verbal and verbal behavior. 
85. Id. at 846-47.  Specifically, subjects in the “crowded theatre” condition were told: 
“Imagine that you and a friend are sitting in a crowded movie theater.  There are people in front of
you, behind you, and to your sides.  Although there are some children, the audience is mostly
adults, and you are just watching the movie previews.”  Those in the “empty theatre condition”
were told:  “Imagine that you and a friend are sitting alone in a movie theater.  You and your friend
have the entire theater to yourself, and you are just watching the movie previews.”  Id. at 846
(internal quotations omitted).
86. Id. at 848.  In the same study, subjects who were asked to think about a crowded movie
theatre and then asked to respond to real words or nonsense words on a computer screen responded
more quickly to real words regarding unaccountability (unaccountable, innocent, and exempt) than
they did to other neutral words (whimsical and impenetrable); in other words, because they were
thinking about being in a large group of people, they were more responsive to words related to the
unaccountability that occurs in groups.  Specifically, those in the “crowded theatre” condition
responded to words regarding unaccountability in an average of 517 milliseconds, while those in
the “empty theatre” condition responded to the same words took an average of 587 milliseconds
to respond.  Id. at 849.
87. Erik K. Stern, Probing the Plausibility of Newgroup Syndrome:  Kennedy and the Bay
of Pigs, in BEYOND GROUPTHINK:  POLITICAL GROUP DYNAMICS AND FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING
at 155 (Paul ‘t Hart et al. eds., 1997).
88. John M. Levine & Richard L. Moreland, Progress In Small Group Research, 41 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 585, 598 (1990).
89. Cameron Anderson & Gavin J. Kilduff, The Pursuit of Status in Social Groups, 18
CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 295, 295 (2009).
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High-status members tend to make more eye contact with other members of the
group, speak more firmly and with fewer hesitations, and have better posture.  90
Similarly, high-status members speak and are spoken to more often, and are more
likely to criticize and interrupt other members of the group.   Moreover, in91
groups, the status of the speaker can be more important than the content of her
contribution.  One study of navy bombing crews found that when the captain
suggested an answer to a navigation problem, other members of the crew were
more likely to accept the answer than they were when it came from the navigator,
even though the navigator was more likely to have the correct answer.92
Status within juries similarly forms very quickly after the group is composed,
often before group members engage in any real interaction with one another.  93
One explanation for this immediate status hierarchy is that group members have
certain expectations about each other and how much they are likely to contribute
to the group.   When the jury forms, its members will evaluate each other and94
decide how much value they think individual members can provide to the group;
those perceived as being the most vital will be given the highest status.   These95
expectations can be based on immutable characteristics like race, age, or gender,
as well as on information group members reveal about themselves, like
occupation or prior jury experience.   The jury accords higher status to people96
with characteristics others expect will be helpful in reaching a verdict.97
Like individuals in any group, jurors also participate in group discussion at
markedly different rates and high status members tend to dominate the
discussion.   In one study, three of twelve jurors were responsible for more than98
90. Levine & Moreland, supra note 88, at 598.
91. Id.
92. Charlan Jeanne Nemeth, Dissent as Driving Cognition, Attitudes, and Judgment, 13 SOC.
COGNITION 273, 275 (1995).
93. Levine & Moreland, supra note 88, at 598-99.
94. Id. at 599; see also Brent Simpson et al., Status Hierarchies and the Organization of
Collective, 30 SOC. THEORY 149, 152 (2012) (noting that “those group members for whom
performance expectations are higher are granted more opportunities to perform, generate more
performance outputs, and have their performance outputs more positively evaluated”).
95. Gavin J. Kilduff & Adam D. Galinsky, From the Ephemeral to the Enduring:  How
Approach-Oriented Mindsets Lead to Greater Status, 105 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 816,
817 (2013) (noting that it is “perceptions of value, rather than value itself, determine status.  As a
result, groups do not necessarily always place their most valuable or competent members in charge;
rather, the ones that appear to be the most valuable or competent achieve higher rank.”).
96. Levine & Moreland, supra note 88, at 599.
97. While this status can change over time as group members contribute to the discussion or
reveal more about themselves, it can be difficult for group members with low-status to overcome
this perception.  Id.  Another theory of rapid status development posits that group members quickly
assess one another’s strength and dominance upon meeting, engage in dominance “contests” like
maintaining eye-contact until one person looks away, and assign status based on the results of these
contests.  Id.; see also Anderson & Kilduff, supra note 89, at 297.
98. HASTIE ET AL., supra note 51, at 28.
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half of the discussion, while another study found that in six-member juries, five
percent of the jurors did not speak at all, and in twelve-member juries, twenty
percent of mock jurors did not speak.   Male jurors tend to speak more than99
female jurors, and jurors with higher economic status also speak more often.  100
Physical location at the jury table is also important:  jurors at the ends and middle
of the table participate more than those in the corners.  101
Generally speaking, higher-status jurors will be more influential during group
deliberations and decisionmaking.   Because jurors with higher status have more102
opportunities to speak, they similarly have more opportunities to guide the course
of deliberation, and to ultimately influence the verdict.   All of these things103
contribute to some jurors guiding the verdict and having greater control over the
jury’s final decision.   This result—that an individual juror with high status can104
exert tremendous influence over the outcome of a trial—is at odds with the ideal
of a representative jury system.  Studies in group decisionmaking and group
dynamics, however, suggest that jurors can be given training and techniques to
ensure that individual jurors, even those with lower status in the group, have
sufficient opportunities to voice their opinions and contribute to the deliberative
process.105
B.  Cohesion
On April 17, 1961, less than three months into his presidency, President John
F. Kennedy ordered the Bay of Pigs invasion in an attempt to overthrow the Fidel
Castro regime in Cuba.  Because it was only the beginning of the Kennedy106
administration, most of the decisionmakers and advisors to the President had been
in their positions for only a few months and most lacked close personal
relationships with the President.   Secretary of State Dean Rusk just met107
Kennedy for the first time in December 1960, and National Security Assistant
McGeorge Bundy knew Kennedy only socially.   Bundy later said that if he had108
known Kennedy better and enjoyed more rapport with him, he would have
99. Id. (citing various studies).
100. Id. (citing various studies).
101. Id. (citing various studies).
102. Stern, supra note 87, at 157.
103. Levine & Moreland, supra note 88, at 600 (“[A] person's status often affects his or her
relations with other group members.  People with higher status have more opportunities to exert
social influence, try to influence other group members more often, and are indeed more influential
than people with lower status.”).
104. Id.  As the authors note, “[a] person’s status can also affect how he or she is evaluated
by others.  Even when they behave in similar ways, people with higher status are often evaluated
more positively than people with lower status.”  Id.
105. See infra Part IV.B.
106. Stern, supra note 87, at 178-79. 
107. Id. at 178. 
108. Id. at 179.  
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questioned the President’s support of the failed invasion.109
Kennedy’s advisers on the Bay of Pigs invasion were considered the “best
and brightest,” and included “[e]lder statesmen, cunning bureaucrats, captains of
industry, and academic luminaries” all of whom participated in extensive group
deliberations with the President.   But the failed invasion was a foreign policy110
disaster.  Kennedy himself later asked, “[H]ow could I have been so stupid as to
let them go ahead?”   How did so many smart individuals make such a poor111
group decision?  In his book, A Thousand Days, Arthur Schlesinger writes that
Kennedy “could not know which of his advisers were competent and which were
not.  For their part, they did not know him or each other well enough to raise hard
questions with force and candor.”   Because they were a new group, and112
therefore unfamiliar with each other, group members lacked “idiosyncrasy credit”
and were more susceptible to conformity—they did not know Kennedy so they
did not speak up.113
Part of the problem was that the group—Kennedy’s administration—was new
and its members were not yet cohesive.  A group is cohesive when its members
“identify strongly with its key features and aspirations.”   One of the earliest114
definitions of group cohesiveness is “all the forces acting on the members to
remain in the group.”   Unlike status hierarchies, cohesion does not occur115
immediately when a group is formed, but instead develops during the life cycle
of the group when it has had the chance to work together and its members have
gotten to know one another.  116
Many studies find that high group cohesion leads to increased productivity
and better group performance.   Specifically, group cohesion can enhance group117
109. Id.
110. Id. at 153.
111. Stern, supra note 87, at 153.
112. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., A THOUSAND DAYS:  JOHN F. KENNEDY IN THE WHITE
HOUSE 258 (2002).
113. Stern, supra note 87, at 179.
114. RUPERT BROWN, GROUP PROCESSES:  DYNAMICS WITHIN AND BETWEEN GROUPS 46
(2000); see also MICHAEL A. HOGG, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP COHESIVENESS:  FROM
ATTRACTION TO SOCIAL IDENTITY 1 (1992) (defining cohesiveness as “the descriptive and technical
term used by social psychologists to refer to the essential property of social groups that is captured
in common parlance by a wide range of other expressions, such as solidarity, cohesion,
comradeship, team spirit, group atmosphere, unity, ‘oneness.’ ‘we-ness,’ ‘groupness,’ and
belongingness”).
115. Leon Festinger, Informal Social Communication, PSYCHOL. REV. 271, 274 (1950).
116. Daniel J. Beal et al., Cohesion and Performance in Groups:  A Meta-Analytic
Clarification of Construct Relations, 88 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 989, 995 (2003).
117. Charles R. Evans & Kenneth L. Dion, Group Cohesion and Performance:  A Meta-
Analysis, 43 SMALL GROUP RES. 690, 695 (2012) (finding that cohesive groups were more
productive than non-cohesive groups in a meta-analysis of twenty seven studies concerning group
cohesion and productivity).  As the authors noted, however, this meta-analysis consisted primarily
of groups like sports teams and military units, where productivity could be measured in terms of
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productivity, improve morale, facilitate group communication, and reduce group
hostility.   Furthermore, social loafing, a phenomenon where group members118
reduce their own efforts because they assume that other members of the group
will put forth the necessary effort,  can be reduced in highly cohesive groups.  119 120
If a jury is cohesive, it is also more likely to reach consensus on a verdict.  121
Moreover, if jurors are simply told they are likely to be able to work well
together, cohesion is increased and group performance improves.   Finally, by122
taking part in training about effective decisionmaking strategies together,
cohesion can be increased and group performance improved.123
C.  Norms
Although groups bring many benefits to decisionmaking, including diversity
of backgrounds, perspectives, and experiences, the benefits of group decisions
can be significantly influenced by an individual member’s willingness to stand
up to the majority or to act in a way that conflicts with the norms of the group. 
As members of a social group, jurors will tailor their behavior to be consistent
with the norms of the group situation, and can feel “anxious, tense, and
embarrassed” if they fail to conform to those norms.   Social norms tell us what124
objective performance criteria.  In other groups, like juries, “performance may depend on more than
the product; it may also depend on the process of production.”  Id. at 696.
118. MICHAEL A. HOGG & DOMINIC ABRAHMS, SOCIAL IDENTIFICATIONS:  A SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND GROUP PROCESSES 94 (1990) (citing various studies
that have found group cohesion “enhances group productivity and performance, increases
conformity to group norms, improves morale and job satisfaction, facilitates intragroup
communication, reduces intragroup hostility . . . , and increases feelings of security and self-
worth”).  Other studies reach different findings.  See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 114, at 217 (“[T]he
relative unimportance of cohesiveness [has] been confirmed in field studies of naturally functioning
groups.”).  Finally, some sources suggest the relationship between cohesion and productivity is
more reciprocal:  while “cohesion aids performance,” it is also true that performance causes
changes in cohesiveness.  FORSYTH, supra note 64, at 138.
119. See infra Part III.B.
120. Steven J. Karau & Kipling D. Williams, The Effects of Group Cohesiveness on Social
Loafing & Social Compensation, 1 GROUP DYNAMICS:  THEORY, RES., & PRAC. 156, 165 (1997).
121. JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, MASTERING VOIR DIRE AND JURY SELECTION:  GAIN AN EDGE
IN QUESTIONING AND SELECTING A JURY 268 (3d ed. 2012).
122. Id.
123. See infra Part IV.
124. Stanley Milgram & John Sabini, On Maintaining Social Norms:  A Field Experiment in
the Subway, in SMALL GROUPS & SOCIAL INTERACTION 190 (Blumberg et al. eds., 1983).  One of
Milgrim’s most famous studies involved subways in New York City.  Milgrim asked graduate
students to do that thing “that just isn’t done” on the subway in a major city:  approach a rider and
ask her to give up her seat.  Id. at 192.  As Milgrim notes, 
The requirements of appropriate social behavior on the subway are, on the face of it,
simple.  People get on the subway for a very clear and specific reason:  to get from one
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is appropriate and acceptable behavior in a given situation, and can have a
significant impact on cognition and behavior.  125
There are two main types of social norms—descriptive and injunctive—and
both have a powerful influence on how individuals choose to act in social
situations.   Descriptive norms are our beliefs about what others are doing, while126
injunctive norms are our feelings about what constitutes acceptable behavior in
others.   For example, people in high-energy-consuming households reduced127
their level of energy consumption when they were told that their electricity
consumption was higher than their neighbors (they had violated a descriptive
norm), and they reduced it even more when they were told that excessive use of
electricity is undesirable (they had violated an injunctive norm).   Similarly,128
college students who believe it is not socially acceptable for teenagers to drink
are significantly less likely to use alcohol,  and those who believe it socially129
place to another in a brief period of time.  The amount of interaction among the riders
required for this purpose is minimal and the rules governing this interaction are widely
adhered to.  One rule of subway behavior is that seats are filled on a first-come, first-
served basis.  Another implicit rule is one that discourages passengers from talking to
one another.  The experimenters in this study violated these rules by asking people for
their seats.
Id. at 186.  When riders were given no explanation (“Excuse me.  May I have your seat?”) they got
up or slid over 68.3% of the time, and when they were given a trivial reason (“Excuse me.  May
I have your seat?  I can’t read my book standing up.”) they gave up their seat 41.9% of the time. 
Id.  But several of the other passengers who overheard the exchange openly chided the person who
had given up the seat, saying things like, “Did you see that?  He asked for a seat!”  Id.  Other
passengers openly stared at the student subjects who asked for a seat.  Id. at 187-89.  Finally, many
of the student subjects found it very difficult to carry out the experiment; they were anxious, tense,
embarrassed, and were frequently “unable to vocalize the request for a seat and had to withdraw.” 
Id.  As Milgrim notes, “[a]n important aspect of the maintenance of social norms is revealed in
[this] emotional reaction” on the part of the student subjects.  Id. at 190.  The students were so
uncomfortable violating the social norm of the subway and doing the thing that “just isn’t done”
that they sometimes could not do it at all.  Id.
125. Cialdini & Goldstein, supra note 60, at 597 (noting that “a close examination of the
seemingly inconsistent literature on norms and their impact on behavior yields a meaningful
distinction between norms that inform us about what is typically approved/disapproved (injunctive
norms) and those that inform us about what is typically done (descriptive norms)”).
126. P. Wesley Schultz et al., The Constructive, Destructive, and Reconstructive Power of
Social Norms, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 429, 430 (2007).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 431-32.  Specifically, “if the household had consumed more than the average, the
researcher drew a sad face (L).  Id.  The valence of the emoticon was used to communicate an
injunctive message of approval or disapproval for the amount of energy being consumed.”  Id. at
431.  Furthermore, the authors noted that they believed these findings will apply to many other
behaviors, including seat-belt use, littering, consumer choices, and illegal downloading of music.
Id. at 433.
129. Andrew Hallim et al., The Role of Social Drinking Motives in the Relationship Between
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unacceptable to gamble are similarly less likely to do so.130
Although people consciously observe the behavior of others to determine
how to act in social situations,  it is also true that some of this norm131
development can occur automatically and unconsciously.  For example, when
college dormitory residents received flyers in their school mailboxes, they were
more likely to litter and throw the flyers on the floor when the mailroom floor
was covered with other flyers and less likely when the floor was clean.  132
Interestingly, they were least likely to litter when the floor was clean, except for
“one piece of highly conspicuous litter (a hollowed-out, end piece of watermelon
rind).”   The students behaved in an orderly way because the environment133
reminded them that the norm was that “everybody behaved orderly except for ‘the
pig that spoiled the place.’”   Similarly, people who were shown a picture of a134
library spoke more quietly because of the situational norm that people
unconsciously associate with libraries.135
When people have simultaneous, yet incompatible beliefs, the tension that
results is known as cognitive dissonance.   Dissonance occurs in both136
individuals and in social groups; when people evaluate their own behavior and
find it different from some standard of judgment they experience cognitive
dissonance.   That standard of judgment can be personal to the individual (“I137
think it is important to respect the environment but I drive an SUV”), or it can be
Social Norms and Alcohol Consumption, 37 ADDICTIVE BEHAV. 1135, 1338 (2012).
130. Mary E. Larimer & Clayton Neighbors, Normative Misperception and the Impact of
Descriptive and Injunctive Norms on College Student Gambling, 17 PSYCHOL. ADDICTIVE BEHAV.
235, 241 (2003).
131. Henk Aarts & Ap Dijksterhuis, The Silence of the Library:  Environment, Situational
Norm, and Social Behavior, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 18, 18–19 (2003).  Situational
norms are defined as “knowledge or mental representations of appropriate behavior that can be
accessed to guide behavior in a specific situation or environment.”  Henk Aarts et al., Automatic
Normative Behavior In Environments:  The Moderating Role Of Conformity In Activating
Situational Norms, 21 SOC. COGNITION 447, 448 (2003).
132. Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct:  Recycling the Concept
of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1015, 1019
(1990).
133. Id.
134. Aarts & Dijksterhuis, supra note 131, at 19 (discussing Cialdini et al., supra note 132).
135. Id. at 19-20.  As the authors note, however, “this effect was qualified by the presence of
the goal to go to the library.”  Id. at 24.  In other words, if people who saw the picture did not
expect to visit a library, they did not speak in quieter voices.  Id. at 24.
136. JENNIFER K. ROBBENOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS: 
UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION, AND DECISION MAKING 20
(2012).  One of the earliest descriptions of cognitive dissonance explains that “[t]he presence of
dissonance leads to action to reduce it just as, for example, the presence of hunger leads to action
to reduce the hunger.”  LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 18 (1962).
137. David C. Matz & Wendy Wood, Cognitive Dissonance in Groups:  The Consequences
of Disagreement, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 22, 22 (2005).
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external to the individual and based on social norms (“I am a member of the
Catholic Church but I believe religious employers should provide birth control
to employees.”). 
People often experience significant discomfort when their behavior or
opinions are different from the group, and this discomfort can motivate
individuals to change their own beliefs to conform to those of the group.   For138
example, in one study subjects were asked their individual opinions on a variety
of social issues.   They were then placed in a group and given the other group139
members’ responses to the same questions.   Those who were grouped with140
others with different opinions experienced significant amounts of dissonance
(specifically they were “uncomfortable and tense”), especially when they were
expected to interact with the group, or to interact until they reached a consensus
on the issues.  141
Going against the norm in a group can be so difficult that it actually triggers
activity in areas of the brain associated with negative mental states.   In a recent142
study testing this effect, researchers used functional magnetic resonance imaging
(“fMRI”) to monitor participants’ neuronal activity while they completed a
task.   Participants were shown two pairs of three-dimensional objects and asked143
to “mentally rotate” them to decide if they were identical.   Before making their144
decisions, they were told about the decisions of a group of peers, whose answers
were incorrect half of the time.   When participants disagreed with the145
group—even when the group’s answers were wrong—there was increased
activity in the amygdala region of the brain, which is closely associated with
negative emotional states.   As the authors noted, “[t]he amygdala activation in146
our experiment was perhaps the clearest marker of the emotional load associated
with standing up for one’s belief.”147
138. Michael I. Norton et al., Vicarious Dissonance:  Attitude Change From the Inconsistency
of Others, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 47, 58-59 (2003).
139. Matz & Wood, supra note 137, at 25.  Specifically, subjects were asked for their opinions
on seven social or campus issues:  “capital punishment, immigration laws, legalized abortion,
tuition increases to provide funding to attract minority students, a law to make flag burning illegal,
gun control, and reinstating a university-wide bonfire celebration that had been terminated because
of safety concerns.”  Id.
140. Id. at 24-25.
141. Id. at 27.  Subjects also experienced a lesser degree of discomfort when they were simply
told about other group member’s differing opinions, but did not expect to interact with the other
group members.  Id.  The same study found similar levels of dissonance and discomfort when mock
jurors disagreed with other members of the jury.  Id. at 29.
142. Berns et al., supra note 57, at 252.
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 246-47 (Figure 1).
145. Id. at 245.
146. Id. at 252.
147. Id.  Interestingly, the “amygdala is also known to modulate social behavior and to be
activated by human faces, particularly when the faces have emotional significance.”  Id. (citing
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Conversely, when a group has a mutual understanding of the applicable
norms—when everyone knows and agrees about what everyone else is supposed
to do—group performance improves.   In a study of physicians and nurses148
working in an emergency room, nurses were asked how “frequently work
problems in their units were solved by ‘having clear and detailed job definitions
for all involved.’”   Researchers then measured various indicators of effective149
care within the hospital, including the promptness of care, the quality of nursing
care, and the quality of medical care.   As normative consensus increased,150
specifically when nurses felt everyone agreed about work expectations in the
emergency room, all of the indicia of effective care correspondingly increased.  151
As the authors noted, “[w]hen agreement about norms exists . . . [t]his provides
a base for coordination and for effective performance.”  152
One of the benefits of the jury system is that jurors incorporate community
values and community norms.   The jury defines the appropriate standard of153
care in a given situation, or it decides what amount of damages will make an
injured person whole.   These are not specific standards, and the jury is expected154
to be a representative of the community in making these sorts of normative
assessments.   Norms are central to the entire concept of a representative jury: 155
“only a body taken from a cross sectional representative group of the community
can meaningfully project community norms.”   If individual jurors are unwilling156
to stand up to the majority, however, or to act in a way that conflicts with the
norms of the group, this unwillingness undermines the benefits of the
representative jury and can lead to decisions based on the beliefs of a few
individual jurors, rather than the decisions of a diverse group of decisionmakers. 
D.  Roles
On January 13, 1982, Air Florida Flight 90 took off from National Airport in
various studies).
148. Linda Argote, Agreement About Norms and Work-Unit Effectiveness:  Evidence From
the Field, 10 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 131, 132 (1989).  The study relied on interviews and
questionnaires of 248 emergency unit physicians, 278 nurses, and 215 hospital physicians in six
Midwestern states.  Id. at 133.
149. Id. at 134.
150. Id. at 132.
151. Id. at 138.  As the authors note, however, “[t]his agreement is likely to vary across
systems.  For example, in one hospital, nurses might think that what administrators expect the
nurses to do is "about right," whereas in another, nurses might think administrators expect the
nurses to do too much paperwork or to exert too little influence over patient care.”  Id. at 132.
152. Id. at 137.
153.  RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 64-66 (2003).
154. Id. at 64-66.
155. Id. at 72.
156. Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 118, 146 (1987).
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Washington, D.C. en route for Fort Lauderdale, Florida.   There had been a157
snowstorm that morning, with approximately four to eight inches of snow in the
Washington area and the flight was delayed for almost two hours.   There were158
seventy-four passengers and five crewmembers on board the flight.   When the159
plane did take off, it was unable to gain proper speed due to ice on the wings and
crashed over the Fourteenth Street Bridge and into the Potomac River.   Only160
five of the people on the plane survived, and the crash also killed four commuters
on the bridge, bringing the death toll to seventy-eight.  161
Although the plane had been cleared for takeoff, the final decision to fly
rested with the pilot.   The official National Transportation Safety Board Report162
blamed ice on the wings for the crash, and specifically the crew’s failure to de-ice
the wings prior to takeoff.   The pilot and the first officer had run through the163
standard pre-flight checklist, and although the first officer had noticed extra ice
building up on the wings and questioned the pilot, the pilot dismissed his
concerns and they continued with the takeoff.   The pilot and the first officer164
“had adopted such a fixed pattern of role responsibilities in their pre-flight checks
that they failed to notice a serious build up of ice on the aircraft’s wings and thus
omitted to activate the deicing devices that were available to deal with the
problem.”165
As part of his “role” as pilot, the pilot on Flight 90 decided to fly the plane,
even though the first officer felt there might be a problem with ice on the
wings.   A “role” is a set of behaviors expected of people who occupy a certain166
position within a group of social situation —pilots fly planes, doctors see167
patients, and waiters serve food.  Like norms, roles are sometimes deliberately
created—an employer appoints a manager or a jury elects a foreperson—or they
can develop more organically.  Even without a deliberate assignment of roles,
157. Kevin Ambrose, The 30 Year Anniversary of the Crash of Air Florida Flight 90, WASH.
POST, (Jan 13, 2012, 4:55 AM), http://alturl.com/exs8n, archived at http://perma.cc/393M-P69A.
158. Connie J. G. Gersick & J. Richard Hackman, Habitual Routines in Task-Performing
Groups, 47 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 65, 65 (1990).
159. Id.
160. Ambrose, supra note 157.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Gersick & Hackman, supra note 158, at 65.
164. Id. at 66-67.
165. BROWN, supra note 114, at 71.
166. Ambrose, supra note 157; see also Gersick & Hackman, supra, note 158, at 66-67
(expressing the hesitancy of the first officer).  
167. BROWN, supra note 114, at 149; see also Travis C. Tubre & Judith M. Collins, Jackson
and Schuler (1985) Revisited:  A Meta-Analysis of the Relationships Between Role Ambiguity, Role
Conflict, and Job Performance, 26 J. MGMT. 155, 155 (2000) (“a role is defined at a pattern of
behaviors”); Ann Bettencourt & Kennon Sheldon, Social Roles as Mechanisms for Psychological
Need Satisfaction Within Social Groups, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1131, 1132 (2001)
(noting that “social roles are typically associated with duties, norms, and expectations”).
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however, groups usually develop some sort of informal role structures through the
process of role differentiation, with roles eventually becoming more narrowly
defined and specialized.168
Discrete and clear-cut roles within groups can help give structure and order
to groups and also help people form identities within the group.   But sometimes169
roles within the group can be ambiguous where the responsibilities required of the
role are not clear to the person occupying it or other members of the group.   Or170
there may be poor “role fit” where the behaviors associated with the role do not
match the personal characteristics of the person who occupies the role.   Role171
ambiguity and poor role fit can result in stress and tension for all group members
and lead to poor group performance.   Overall, groups tend to perform172
better—they make better choices and work more efficiently—when group
members share the same ideas about their task and the role they each play in the
group.  173
The role of the leader is a fundamental one in many groups, and the role of
the foreperson is a significant one in juries.   In some states and in some federal174
jurisdictions, the trial judge commonly appoints the foreperson, and in three
states—Maryland, Massachusetts and Rhode Island—the judge is required to do
so.   When the jury elects the foreperson, however, that person tends to be175
168. BROWN, supra note 114, at 150.
169. Id. at 72.
170. Mark R. Beauchamp et al., Role Ambiguity, Role Efficacy, and Role Performance: 
Multidimensional and Meditational Relationships Within Interdependent Sport Teams, 6 GROUP
DYNAMICS:  THEORY, RES., & PRAC. 229, 229 (2002) (“Role ambiguity refers to a lack of clear
information associated with a particular role.”). 
171. Bettencourt & Sheldon, supra note 167, at 1140 (defining “role-fit” as the
“correspondence between role requirement and person characteristics.”).
172. Mark R. Beauchamp & Steven R. Bray, Role Ambiguity and Role Conflict Within
Interdependent Teams, 32 SMALL GROUP RES. 133, 148 (2001) (finding that elite university athletes
in interdependent sports teams—“elite sport teams characterized by a high degree of
interdependence (such as hockey, rugby, soccer, and basketball) in which members’ role-related
functions are likely to be prevalent, identifiable, and highly integrated with those of other team
members”—with greater levels of role ambiguity had worse performance); see also Bettencourt &
Sheldon, supra note 167, at 1140 (finding that the “degree to which an assigned role corresponded
with a person’s strengths and characteristics influenced experiences of authenticity and
connectedness while playing the role.”).
173. John E. Mathieu et al., The Influence of Shared Mental Models on Team Process and
Performance, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 273, 279-80 (2000).
174. BROWN, supra note 114, at 150.
175. Andrew Horwitz, Mixed Signals and Subtle Cues:  Jury Independence and Judicial
Appointment of the Jury Foreperson, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 829, 830 (2005).  As Horwitz points out,
this practice is problematic for a variety of reasons:  Unlike the much more traditional practice of
allowing the jury to elect its own foreperson, judicial appointment of the foreperson is fraught with
a variety of serious infirmities, many of them of constitutional magnitude.  A substantial body of
case law and literature—as well as common sense—tells us that anything that a trial judge says or
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white, male, and seated at the end of the table.   The foreperson has often had,176
or claims to have had, prior jury experience  and is usually the first person to177
mention the need for a foreperson.178
A recent study of mock juries found that even where there were an almost
even number of men and women on juries, only two of the fourteen nominated
forepersons were woman and the remaining twelve were men.   Speaking first179
is often a strong predictor of who is chosen as foreperson, but this study found
that most of the time when women spoke first, it was to nominate a male member
of the jury as foreperson.   Young people are also underrepresented as180
foreperson:  while forty-two percent of jurors were between eighteen and thirty-
five years of age, only twenty-four percent of elected forepersons were, and sixty-
five percent of forepersons were between forty-five and sixty-five years of age.  181
Extroverted jurors are more likely to be elected foreperson,  as are those with182
more education and higher social economic status.   Most of the time,183
does during a trial is likely to be perceived by all of the trial participants, including the jurors, as
a reflection of the judge’s personal views and opinions. 
176. HASTIE ET AL., supra note 51, at 28 (1983); see also VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 2, at
143 (noting that when jurors select the foreperson, “it tends to be a person who is high in social
status, has a college degree, and has experience in group settings, leadership positions, or prior jury
service.  Women are less likely to be chosen than would be expected from their representation on
the jury.”); Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 205, 214 (1989) (noting that seat location is often explicitly given as a reason for the
selection of the foreperson:  “In the majority of cases the jurors explicitly gave table position as
their reason for their choice—‘you should do it, you’re sitting in the right place.’”).
177. Devine et al., supra note 19, at 696; see also Ellsworth, supra note 176, at 213.  Ellsworth
describes the typical conversation that occurs during the selection of the foreperson:  Id.  When the
jurors had arrived in the room and settled in their seats, someone would point out that their first job
was to choose a foreman, and then typically someone would ask, “Has anybody had any experience
with this sort of thing?”  Id.  A man would claim experience, and the other jurors would agree that
he should take the job.  Id.  Occasionally, two men would claim experience and a brief “after you,
Alphonse” discussion would ensue until one of them said, “all right, I’ll do it.”  Id.  These two
scenarios account for foreman selection in ten of the eighteen juries.  Id.  Of course, as Ellsworth
notes, the person selected did not always have jury experience.  Id.  In this study, thirty-nine percent
of the foremen selected had served on juries, while thirty-six percent of other jurors who were not
elected also had previous jury experience, an insignificant difference.  Id.
178. Devine et al., supra note 19, at 696.
179. Louise Ellison & Vanessa E. Munro, Getting to (Not) Guilty:  Examining Jurors’
Deliberative Processes in, and Beyond, the Context of a Mock Rape Trial, 30 LEGAL STUD. 74, 89
(2010).  Moreover, the two women who were selected foreperson nominated themselves.  Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. John Clark et al., Five Factor Model Personality Traits, Jury Selection, and Case
Outcomes in Criminal and Civil Cases, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 641, 644 (2007).
183. Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict
Consequences:  Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 549 (1992).
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foreperson selection occurs in the first four minutes of deliberation and within ten
or twenty statements by jurors.   As noted above, not all jurors participate184
equally, and the foreperson tends to talk two to three times more than other
jurors.185
The roles that individuals have in the group can have a significant impact of
the quality of the jury’s deliberation and decisionmaking.  If jurors are uncertain
about their roles because of role ambiguity or poor role fit, this uncertainty can
lead to stress and tension among jury members and poorer performance.   This186
result is especially likely in juries, because of the high degree of task
interdependence:  each individual juror’s role in the deliberative process is
dependent and interwoven with other jurors’ roles.   For example, in one study,187
college athletes with high role ambiguity—specifically they were unsure of the
scope of their responsibilities on the team—played more poorly than other
players.  188
Because the role of foreperson is an important one with significant impact on
the form and content of deliberation, choosing a foreperson because they are
white, male, older, or more extraverted, is in stark contrast to the ideals of a
representative jury.  We should give jurors additional information about the
important role the foreperson plays; this additional information will help all jurors
cope with role stress by making the duties of the foreperson and the behavior
associated with them more explicit.  189
III.  THE ROLE OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE ON JURY DECISIONMAKING
We trust groups of jurors with decisionmaking because we think that the
diversity of the group and the resources of its individual members will lead to
improved decisionmaking, that “two heads are better than one.”  Moreover, jury
diversity is an important part of the representative jury system and gives
heightened legitimacy to the legal process.  Many studies highlight the benefits
of diverse juries:  juries composed of diverse members deliberate longer and
consider more information than juries that are less diverse.   In one recent study190
184. Ellison & Munro, supra note 179, at 88; Diamond & Casper, supra note 183, at 547.
185. HASTIE ET AL., supra note 51, at 28.; Ellison & Munro, supra note 179, at 88.
186. Beauchamp et al., supra note 170, at 229.
187. Id. (explaining that “when role occupants’ responsibilities are interwoven with those of
other individuals in an organizational system, the impact of role ambiguity on the role occupant
personally should be more problematic compared with when role occupants function more or less
independently of others.  Furthermore, in situations characterized by interdependence of roles,
ambiguity could be predicted to influence the thoughts and behaviors of both the role occupant and
the other individuals (e.g., group members) with whom he or she interacts.”).
188. Id. at 238.
189. Robert D. Pritchard et al., The Productivity Measurement and Enhancement System:  A
Meta-Analysis, 93 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 540, 558 (2008); see also infra Part IV.C.
190. Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making:  Identifying
Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
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of mock juries, white jurors “raised more case facts, made fewer factual errors,
and were more amenable to discussion of race-related issues when they were
members of a diverse group.”   Diversity also improves creativity within the191
group, flexibility in decisionmaking, and thoughtfulness.  192
But relying on diverse groups of individuals to reach decisions about difficult
topics has its drawbacks.  When people become members of a jury, individual
jurors lose some of their independence and must coordinate their actions with
other jurors.  While particular jurors may have greater or less influence over the
group because of group dynamics like status, norms, and roles, the group itself
still has a profound influence on those individual jurors.  This type of social
influence—or the “interpersonal processes that produce, sometimes directly but
often very subtly and indirectly, changes in other people”—flows from the group
to the individual, and from the individual to the group.   Jurors may feel193
pressure to modify their opinions and judgments to conform to the majority of
other jurors.  Relatedly, jurors may experience certain motivation losses, like
“social loafing” and the “free-rider effect” when they are acting as a group
because they do not feel the same responsibility to act as they would if they were
acting alone.   We can examine group conformity and motivation losses among194
groups to get a better sense of how these group dynamics influence jury
deliberation and decisionmaking.
A.  Group Conformity
“We are discreet sheep; we wait to see how the drove is going, and then go with
the drove.”
–Mark Twain195
Although people tend to explain behavior in terms of individual personalities,
social situations also have a profound influence on human behavior and
individuals are often quick to conform to the behavior of others.   In a series of196
famous experiments testing behavior in a group setting, Solomon Ashe asked
597, 606 (2006).
191. Id.  In this case, “diversity” meant there were four whites and two blacks in each of the
six-member juries.  Id. at 601.  A variety of studies support the idea that diversity leads to better
group performance.  See, e.g., Karen A. Jehn et al., Why Differences Make a Difference:  A Field
Study of Diversity, Conflict, and Performance in Workgroups, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 741, 757 (1999).
192. Sommers, supra note 190, at 598 (citing various studies).  At the same time, some studies
suggest that “diversity creates social divisions that, in turn, create poor social integration and
cohesion, resulting in negative outcomes for the group.”  Elizabeth Mannix & Margaret A. Neale,
What Differences Make a Difference?  The Promise and Reality of Diverse Teams in Organizations,
6 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 31, 34 (2005).
193. FORSYTH, supra note 64, at 178. 
194. Henningsen et al., supra note 1, at 168.
195. MARK TWAIN’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY VOL. II, 10 (1924). 
196. FISKE, supra note 24, at 7.
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groups of college students to participate in what they were told was an experiment
testing perception.   Subjects were asked to compare the length of a “standard”197
line against three “comparison lines.”   One of the comparison lines was the198
same as the standard line, while the other two were much longer or much
shorter.   Unbeknownst to the real subjects in the study, the other members of199
the group were instructed to give the same wrong answer before the subject gave
his own answer.   After hearing the confederate’s incorrect answer, seventy-five200
percent of participants went along at least once with the confederate’s mistakes,
which were obvious errors of half an inch to three-quarter of an inch on lines that
were anywhere between two and ten inches.   In contrast, when subjects were201
asked to make independent judgments, they were correct over ninety-nine percent
of the time.   On average, participants in the experimental groups were wrong202
a third of the time, with no other cause than conformity to the group—the social
situation—and “contradicting the clear evidence of his senses.”203
Although the conformity seen in Ashe’s studies was extreme, people conform
their behavior to that of others in group settings all of the time, sometimes
without even realizing they are doing so.   When we observe the actions of204
others, it actually triggers the same neurophysiological response as if we took the
action ourselves.   “Mirror neurons” in the frontal lobes of monkeys discharge205
when the monkey grasps a piece of food and when it watches another monkey
make a similar grasping motion.   Similar research of human fMRIs shows that206
197. Solomon E. Ashe, Studies of Independence and Conformity:  A Minority of One Against
a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS 1, 3 (1956). 
198. Id. at 3.
199. The standard line varied from two to ten inches, and the comparison lines differed from
the standard lines by ½ to 1 ¾ inches, as indicated in this example from the study:
Id. at 6, Table 1.
200. Id. at 3.
201. Id. at 9.
202. Id. at 3.
203. Id. 
204. FORSYTH, supra note 64, at 196.
205. GÜN R. SEMIN, Grounding Communication:  Synchrony, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: 
HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES 632-33 (Arie W. Kruglanski & Tory Higgins eds., 2007).
206. Vittorio Gallese et al., Action Recognition in the Premotor Cortex, 119 BRAIN 593, 593
(1996).
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the premotor cortex is active when people watch other people act.   The mind207
creates a “neural replica” of the observed action—“that is, the regions activated
correspond to those that are active during the execution of the action.”   We208
mimic the facial expressions of the people around us, as well as their motor
behavior, accents, speech rhythms, and moods.   Human beings are social209
animals and this type of social coordination with the group is necessary for
survival.  210
People also compare their opinions to the people around them and evaluate
the accuracy of their own beliefs and decisions in comparison to those of the
group.   Like other individual decisions, groups make decisions and interpret211
information along a continuum from quick intuitive judgments to slower, more
thoughtful reasoning.   Groups, like individuals, sometimes rely on “fast,” or212
intuitive, categorical thinking, and they are also sometimes more systematic, or
“slow” in their thinking.   In the jury setting, jurors might not pay attention to213
207. G. Buccino et al., Action Observation Activates Premotor and Parietal Areas in a
Somatotopic Manner:  An fMRI Study, 13 EUR. J. NEUROSCIENCE 400, 401 (2001).  There is,
however, a recent debate in the neuroscience literature about these findings.  See Gregory Hickok,
Eight Problems for the Mirror Neuron Theory of Action Understanding in Monkeys and Humans,
21 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1229, 1240 (2008) (suggesting that “the ‘mirror system’ is not the
basis for action understanding”).
208. SEMIN, supra note 205, at 633.
209. Simone Kühn et al., Why Do I Like You When You Behave Like Me?  Neural Mechanisms
Mediating Positive Consequences of Observing Someone Being Imitated, 5 SOC. NEUROSCIENCE
384, 384 (2010).
210. Patrick Bourgeois & Ursula Hess, The Impact of Social Context on Mimicry, 77
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 343, 343 (2008). 
211. FORSYTH, supra note 64, at 196.
212. See Serena Chen et al., Motivated Heuristic and Systematic Processing, 10 PSYCHOL.
INQUIRY 44 (1999) (citing various studies); see also GORDON B. MOSKOWITZ, SOCIAL COGNITION: 
UNDERSTANDING SELF AND OTHERS 194 (2005) (describing the dual-process model coined by
Marilynn Brewer.  There are a variety of dual-process models, including Brewer’s dual-process
model, the heuristic-schematic model coined by Shelley Chaiken, and the theory of lay epistemics
developed by Arie Kruglanski.  The various models use different terminology, but all of them
describe people as using a combination of default information processing including schemas and
heuristics, as well as more effortful and deliberate mental processing.  For a review of the various
models, see id. at 195-219.
213. Daniel Kahneman refers to these two ways of thinking as System One and System Two
reasoning.  Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality:  Psychology for Behavioral
Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1451 (2003).  In System One, or heuristic reasoning, groups
make decisions quickly, and often base those decisions on instincts, emotions, schemas, or
stereotypes.  This type of “fast thinking” has evolved because people and groups need to manage
a complex environment with limited cognitive resources.  Id.  (describing the operations of System
One as “fast, automatic, effortless, associative, and often emotionally charged; they are also
governed by habit, and are therefore difficult to control or modify.”).  In contrast, System Two, or
systematic reasoning, relies on deliberate and reflective cognition, where groups take their time and
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the discussion, not really understand the arguments, or forget what others say, all
of which can trigger “fast” thinking.   Studies have shown that group members214
often base their decision on the general mood of the group instead of the quality
of the arguments,  and they are more willing to believe a minority view when215
the person speaks more abstractly and avoids specifics.   Another shortcut216
individuals use is preference for the popular choice:  people look to others’
choices in deciding how to invest their money, how many children to have, and
whether to adopt new technology.   This phenomenon is known as “herding,”217
and it has a rational basis:  “paying heed to what everyone else is doing is rational
because their decisions may reflect information that they have and we do not.”218
The influence of the majority in jury deliberations also depends on these
types of cognitive shortcuts or heuristics.  If jurors think that the minority view
is becoming more popular with other jury members, they may shift sides.  In one
study, subjects were given a five-page summary of the trial and jury deliberations
in the movie Twelve Angry Men.   First, the subjects were told that the jury vote219
was eleven against one to convict the defendant.   When the subjects were asked220
to rate the guilt of the defendant after that first vote, almost all of them agreed
with the majority.   But when subjects were subsequently told that after221
deliberations progressed, the jury’s vote began shifting toward not guilty, the
subjects shifted their own votes from guilty to not guilty.   As the authors noted,222
“participants were influenced by both majority defection to the minority position
and the number of persons who presented arguments for the minority position.”223
think carefully and slowly about evidence before reaching a decision.  Id. (describing the operations
of System Two as “slower, serial, effortful, and deliberately controlled; they are also relatively
flexible and potentially rule-governed.”).  Of course, not all “fast” decisionmaking is bad
decisionmaking.  For a discussion of the benefits of intuitive thinking in judicial decisionmaking,
see Linda Berger, A Revised View of the Judicial Hunch, 10 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC:  JALWD
1 (2013).
214. FORSYTH, supra note 64, at 198.
215. Eddie M.W. Tong et al., Conformity:  Moods Matter, 38 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 601, 607
(2008).  As the authors note, good moods are associated with System One/heuristic thinking, while
bad moods are more associated with System Two/deliberative thinking.  Id. at 602 (citing various
studies).
216. Harold Sigall et al., Minority Influence Is Facilitated When the Communication Employs
Linguistic Abstractness, 9 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 443, 449 (2006) (noting that “no
such effect occurred when the communicator represented the majority”).
217. Abjihit Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107, Q. J. ECON. 797, 797-98 (1992).
218. Id. at 798.
219. Russell D. Clark III, Effects of Majority Defection and Multiple Minority Sources on
Minority Influence, 5 GROUP DYNAMICS:  THEORY, RES., & PRAC. 57, 59 (2001).
220. Id. at 59.
221. Id. at 59-61.
222. Id.  The subjects were told that after deliberations, the jury’s vote shifted from nine to
three to convict, and then to six to six, to three to nine, and eventually to zero to twelve.  Id.
223. Id. at 60.
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Diverse groups of individuals bring different life experiences and
backgrounds to the jury, but are also susceptible to social influence and will tend
to conform their beliefs and behaviors to other members of the jury.   This224
social influence has an especially significant effect when individual jurors are in
the minority.  The tendency to conform to the group and to rely on cognitive
shortcuts means that the minority view can often go unmentioned and
unexamined in the context of group deliberations.
B.  Social-Loafers and Free-Riders
“Got a good reason
For taking the easy way out now.”
–John Lennon & Paul McCartney, Day Tripper225
Although juries often possess tremendous resources, including the
background and experiences of individual jurors, they do not always use the
resources of their individual members effectively.   In juries, as in all groups,226
productivity is often lower than the potential productivity of individual members
because of both “coordination losses” and “motivation losses.”   Coordination227
losses, or “productivity losses,” occurs in groups because by their very nature
groups allow for only one person to talk at a time and other members cannot (or
usually should not) speak during that time.   This aspect of group228
decisionmaking prohibits individuals from speaking about their ideas as they
occur, especially if other members of the group are dominating the
conversation.   Those ideas may then be forgotten, or dismissed, as the229
individual listens to other members of the group.   Motivation losses, on the230
other hand, occur for a variety of reasons, but can be broadly categorized as the
224. Id. at 58.
225. JOHN LENNON & PAUL MCCARTNEY, DAY TRIPPER (EMI Studios 1965).
226. Henningsen et al., supra note 1, at 168.  Recent studies on “brainstorming,” for example,
suggest that people who brainstorm alone come up with more ideas—and more good ideas—than
people who brainstorm in groups.  See Nicholas W. Kohn & Steven M. Smith, Collaborative
Fixation:  Effects of Others’ Ideas on Brainstorming, 25 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 359, 359
(2011) (citing various studies).
227. The most often cited description of this process is Steiner’s work on “process losses” in
groups.  See IVAN D. STEINER, GROUP PROCESS AND PRODUCTIVITY (1972).  For a more recent
review, see Henningsen et al., supra note 1, at 168.
228. Henningsen et al., supra note 1, at 168.
229. Id.
230. Bernard A. Nijstad et al., Cognitive Stimulation And Interference In Groups:  Exposure
Effects In An Idea Generation Task, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 535, 537 (2002).  For an
application of the theory to intelligence analysis teams, see Susan G. Straus et al., The Group
Matters:  A Review of Processes and Outcomes in Intelligence Analysis, 15 GROUP DYNAMICS: 
THEORY, RES., & PRAC. 128, 131 (2011).
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problems of social loafing and free-riding.  231
When people work alone, they often work harder than when they work in
groups.  When people work in groups, some group members reduce their own232
efforts because they assume that other members of the group will put forth the
necessary effort to complete the assigned task.   This phenomenon, known as233
“social loafing,” is true across a variety of tasks.   Social loafing occurs in tasks234
requiring physical effort like rope-pulling and cheering, as well as in tasks
requiring cognitive effort like brainstorming and writing poems.   Students are235
often implicitly aware of this phenomenon:  because they think that other group
members will not do their share of the work, students often prefer courses where
individual efforts toward group work is counted in the grade, and avoid those
courses where all group members receive the same grade on the project.   This236
loafing occurs—at least in part—because when the group’s efforts are combined,
individual effort becomes lost.  “Because participants can receive neither credit
nor blame for the individual performances, they loaf.”  237
Groups that are less cohesive tend to have higher instances of social loafing
and poorer performance overall.   Social loafing in less cohesive groups is238
present in cognitive tasks  and physical tasks,  and has also been seen in239 240
creative partnerships as well, like songwriting and filmmaking.  For example, one
study considered the quality and creativity of 162 Beatles songs written by John
Lennon and Paul McCartney.   Researchers found that for songs written before241
231. Kerr & Tindale, supra note 56, at 628.
232. Id. at 625; see also Kenneth H. Price et al., Withholding Inputs in Team Contexts: 
Member Composition, Interaction Processes, Evaluation Structure, and Social Loafing, 91 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1375, 1375 (2006).
233. Henningsen et al., supra note 1, at 168.
234. Id.
235. For a comprehensive review of the original social loafing literature, see Steven J. Karau
& Kipling D. Williams, Social Loafing:  A Meta-Analytic Review and Theoretical Integration, 65
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 681 (1993).  For a more recent review, see Ashley Simms &
Tommy Nichols, Social Loafing:  A Review of the Literature, 15 J. MGMT. POLICY & PRACTICE 58,
65 (2014).
236. Jody R. Hoffman & Steven G. Rogelberg, All Together Now? College Students’ Preferred
Project Group Grading Procedures, 5 GROUP DYNAMICS:  THEORY, RES., & PRAC. 33, 38 (2001).
237. Stephen G. Harkins & Jeffrey M. Jackson, The Role of Evaluation in Eliminating Social
Loafing, 11 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 457, 458 (1985).  The term “social loafing” was
originally coined by Bibb Latané.  See Bibb Latané et al., Many Hands Make Light the Work:  The
Causes and Consequences of Social Loafing, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 822, 826 (1979).
238. Rune Høigaard et al., The Effect of Team Cohesion on Social Loafing in Relay Teams,
18 INT’L J. APPLIED SPORTS SCI. 59, 68 (2006).
239. Paul W. Mulvey & Howard J. Klein, The Impact of Perceived Loafing and Collective
Efficacy on Group Goal Processes and Group Performance, 74 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 62, 84-85 (1998).
240. Høigaard et al., supra note 238, at 68.
241. Jeffrey M. Jackson & Vernon R. Padgett, With a Little Help from My Friend:  Social
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1967, individually written songs were less likely to be selected as singles and did
not do as well on the Billboard charts.   The situation was reversed, however,242
for songs written after 1967; at that point, songs that were solo-written were more
popular.   As the authors note, “during the 1966-1967 years profound changes243
occurred.  Perhaps these resulted from experimentation with drugs and film-
making, the death of their manager Brian Epstein, the appearance of Yoko Ono,
the change from live performances to studio recording, or the realization that they
had become the most popular rock group of the time.”   The researchers244
theorized that as Lennon and McCartney began growing apart, they had reduced
cohesiveness and more opportunity for social loafing.  245
Although social loafing can be detrimental to group performance, it has a
rational basis.  Social loafing often occurs because people feel that their
individual contributions to a group effort will not be noticed or are not necessary
for the group’s success.   If people do not think their individual contributions246
will be noticed—or missed—it is rational for them to reduce their own effort and
leave the work to others.   In the classic study of this effect, people participating247
in a tug-of-war performed at a fraction of their individual potential when they
performed in groups.   In other words, they reduced their efforts as the group248
size increased because they felt that other members would compensate for
them.  249
Closely related to the problem of social loafing is the problem of free-riders: 
if group members think their individual efforts will not be helpful to the group,
Loafing and the Lennon-McCartney Songs, 8 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 672, 675
(1982).  Prolific song-writers, Lennon and McCartney wrote a total of 162 songs as members of the
Beatles:  John Lennon wrote seventy songs individually, McCartney wrote forty five, and they
collaborated on forty seven.  Id.
242. Id. 
243. Id.
244. Id. at 673-74.
245. Id. at 676.  However, in another study of individual and group songwriting credits of
Billboard number one songs in the United States from 1955 to 2009, researchers found that
individual and group songs were equally represented at the top of the Billboard charts.  Terry F.
Pettijohn II & Shujaat F. Ahmed, Songwriting Loafing or Creative Collaboration?:  A Comparison
of Individual & Team Written Billboard Hits in the USA, 7 J. ARTICLES SUPPORT NULL HYPOTHESIS
1, 3 (2010) (“Individuals or groups may create musical hits and social loafing in groups may occur
in certain situations, but not always.”).
246. See Alan G. Ingham, The Ringelmann Effect:  Studies of Group Size and Group
Performance, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 371 (1974) (describing French agricultural
engineer Max Ringelmann’s original 1927 study).  
247. Id.
248. Id. at 371-72 (explaining if individual performance is considered 100% of potential,
participants performed at ninety-three percent of their potential in pairs, eighty-five percent of their
potential in groups of three, and forty-nine percent of their potential in groups of eight).  
249. Id. at 371–72.
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they have a tendency to “free-ride” off of the efforts of others.   The main250
difference between social loafing and free-riding is that social loafers reduce their
effort because it is not essential for the group’s success, while free-riders do not
contribute to the group’s task at all.   Many economists believe that because so251
few elections are close calls and because of the personal costs in terms of time
and effort in going to the polls, “a rational individual should abstain from
voting.”   Similarly, because a listener receives the same benefit whether or not252
they donate money to public radio, “most donors should therefore choose to free-
ride.”   The free-rider effect tends to increase as groups grow larger, both253
because individual behavior is less noticeable in larger groups,  and because254
individual members’ perceptions of the utility of their contributions declines in
bigger groups.  255
Social loafing and free-riding can be reduced or even eliminated when
individual contributions to a group effort are identifiable,  and when people feel256
their contributions are unique or indispensible.   Individuals also loaf and free-257
ride less in smaller groups, probably because they are more likely to feel their
individual contributions are necessary for the group’s success.   Furthermore,258
people are generally more willing to work harder on a group task when they think
their individual contributions will be helpful in reaching an outcome they find
personally valuable.   These “valuable outcomes” can be objective, like259
250. Kameda et al., supra note 59, at 76.
251. Id.
252. Patricia Funk, Social Incentives and Voter Turnout:  Evidence from the Swiss Mail Ballot
System, 8 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 1077, 1077 (2010).
253. LISE VESTURLUND, WHY DO PEOPLE GIVE? THE NONPROFIT SECTOR:  A RESEARCH
HANDBOOK 568, 572 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg, eds., 2006).
254. Norbert L. Kerr & Steven E. Bruun, Dispensability of Member Effort and Group
Motivation Losses:  Free-Rider Effects, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 78, 79 (1983).
255. Id. at 92.  If group members become suspicious that some members are free-riding, they
sometimes reduce their own effort to match that of the free-riders.  Norbert L. Kerr, Motivation
Losses in Small Groups:  A Social Dilemma Analysis, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 819,
820–25 (1983).  This reduction in effort is known as “the sucker effect,” whereby other group
members will reduce their own efforts instead of playing the “sucker.”  Id.  As one study observed,
“apparently, subjects sometimes preferred to fail at the task rather than be a sucker and carry a free
rider.”  Id.  A more recent study has shown that the sucker effect is strongest when individuals think
other members of the group are competent to perform the task, but lazy.  Jason W. Hart et al.,
Coworker Ability and Effort as Determinants of Individual Effort on a Collective Task, 5 GROUP
DYNAMICS:  THEORY, RES., & PRAC. 181, 187 (2001).
256. Price et al., supra note 232, at 1379.
257. Kerr & Bruun, supra note 254, at 92; Simms & Nichols, supra note 235, at 65.
258. Tatsuya Kameda et al., Social Dilemmas, Subgroups, and Motivation Loss in Task-
Oriented Groups:  In Search of an “Optimal” Team Size in Division of Work, 55 SOC. PSYCHOL.
Q. 47, 54 (1992) (concluding motivation peaked in four-person groups and declined in both smaller
and larger groups).
259. Karau & Williams, supra note 120, at 156.  The authors termed this idea the “Collective
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receiving a paycheck, or subjective, like gaining satisfaction, a feeling of
belonging, or a feeling of self-worth.   Furthermore, much of people’s self-260
conceptions derive from their membership in various groups.   Because people261
generally want other people to view them positively, they are motivated to
enhance their status in the group.   When the group becomes a part of an262
individual member’s identity, those individuals will work harder for the benefit
of the group, individual productivity will increase and social loafing and free-
riding will decrease.263
Just as conformity in groups can affect individual behavior and cognition, the
productivity of individual group members is also influenced by the presence of
the group.  Although people tend to be less productive when they believe other
members of the group will make up the difference, we can reduce social loafing
and free-riding by making individual effort identifiable and making individuals
accountable for their contributions to the group decision.
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS:  TRAINING BETTER JURORS
“It’s all to do with the training:  you can do a lot if you’re properly trained.”
–Queen Elizabeth II
Training—or “a systematic approach to learning and development to improve
individual, team, and organizational effectiveness”—improves the performance
of both individuals and groups.   A meta-analysis of 165 studies found that264
training improves performance.  Moreover, a vast scholarly literature analyzing265
effective training details its benefits to performance, in fields ranging from social
and organizational psychology to human resource development and knowledge
management.   Studies show that training increases innovation, enhances266
strategic knowledge (knowing when to apply a specific knowledge or skill), and
Effort Model.”  Id. at 157.
260. Id.
261. Anderson & Kilduff, supra note 89, at 295 (noting that “the implications of achieving
high status in one’s group are profound.  Those higher in the social order tend to have more access
to scarce resources; receive more social support; and enjoy better physical health, a longer life span,
and better reproductive success.”).
262. Id. at 297.
263. Nathan C. Pettit & Robert B. Lount, Jr., Looking Down And Ramping Up:  The Impact
of Status Differences on Effort in Intergroup Contexts, 46 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 9, 10
(2009).
264. Aguinis & Kraiger, supra note 6, at 452–53.
265. Winfred Arthur Jr. et al., Effectiveness of Training in Organizations:  A Meta-Analysis
of Design and Evaluation Features, 88 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 234 (2003).  By one estimate,
companies in the United States spent over 164 billion dollars in 2012 on training for employees. 
AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT, STATE OF THE INDUSTRY REPORT (2013),
available at http://alturl.com/anwhk, archived at http://perma.cc/LJB9-TPQ6.
266. Aguinis & Kraiger supra note 6, at 452.
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can improve cooperation and communication within groups, which can ultimately
improve decisionmaking.  267
Most scholars have recognized a causal link between a better decisionmaking
process and better outcomes—“[a] ‘better’ process leads to a more advantageous
result.”   Yet jurors—who are asked to work with others to make incredibly268
important decisions—are given almost no instruction, let alone any sort of formal
training in decisionmaking or group dynamics.  And while many empirical
studies have found that jurors are competent decisionmakers,  often reaching the269
same or similar decisions as judges, some additional training could be
enormously helpful in assisting jurors to overcome many of the challenges all
groups face in coming to decisions.  Furthermore, this training does not have to
be extensive, nor should it replace the common-sense approach that we hope lay
jurors will bring to their decisionmaking.  Instead, some simple training in group
decisionmaking and the common pitfalls associated with group dynamics can
enhance the way lay jurors approach the information they hear during a trial and
improve decisionmaking.
Many model jury instructions contain a short instruction to jurors about their
“duty to deliberate.”   For example, the Ninth Circuit Model Civil Jury270
Instructions say that after electing a foreperson, jurors should “discuss the case
with . . . fellow jurors to reach agreement if you can do so” and that the verdict
must be unanimous.   The instructions continue:  “[e]ach of you must decide the271
case for yourself, but you should do so only after you have considered all of the
evidence, discussed it fully with the other jurors, and listened to the views of your
fellow jurors.  Do not hesitate to change your opinion if the discussion persuades
you that you should.  Do not come to a decision simply because other jurors think
it is right.”  272
Beyond this instruction, however, jurors are given little or no guidance about
effective decisionmaking strategies, or strategies for working in a group. 
Working with a group of people to analyze complex information and reach a
verdict requires skills, knowledge, and attitudes that many lay jurors do not
possess.   And while a group of diverse decisionmakers is an important part of273
the jury system, this group superiority is lost if some jurors do not discuss all of
the relevant information or capitulate to the majority opinion without thoughtful
deliberation.  Furthermore, because jurors have diverse sets of knowledge,
267. Id. at 454-56.
268. Randall S. Peterson, A Directive Leadership Style in Group Decision Making Can Be
Both Virtue and Vice:  Evidence From Elite and Experimental Groups, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1107, 1107 (1997).
269. See Robbennolt, supra note 32.
270. See 3.1 DUTY TO DELIBERATE, supra note 3.
271. Id.
272. Id. 
273. RICHARD L. MORELAND ET AL., TRAINING PEOPLE TO WORK IN GROUPS, SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL ISSUES:  APPLICATIONS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH ON
GROUPS 37, 39 (Tindale et al., eds., 1998).
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procedures that structure deliberations are especially important to increase
information sharing and effective decisionmaking and even simple training and
recommended procedures can improve performance.  274
Like all human cognition, group decisionmaking involves acquisition and use
of information and typically involves four phases, which we can apply to jurors: 
accumulation, interaction, examination, and accommodation.   In the275
accumulation phase, the jurors become aware of and acquire new knowledge and
information about the law and the evidence in a trial.   Jurors will also filter out276
certain information at this stage and decide it is unnecessary or irrelevant to the
verdict.   In the interaction phase, the jurors will recall information they have277
learned and share this information with one another; this process is influenced by
communication within the group, and which jurors decide to speak.   In the278
examination phase, jurors will evaluate and interpret the information they have
learned during the trial.   By highlighting certain information or presenting279
arguments to other jurors, individual jurors can have tremendous influence on
group decisionmaking at this stage and the evaluation of information is largely
impacted by the roles and status of the jurors who contribute to the
deliberations.   Because individuals with higher status often dominate group280
discussion, these contributions are often weighted more heavily in the jury’s
decision.   Finally, in the accommodation phase, jurors integrate their various281
opinions to reach a verdict.282
While movement from one phase to another can be linear, it can also be
recursive, with decisionmakers moving back and forth between phases.   When283
jurors do not have a good idea about how to approach the task of reaching a
verdict, they will spend more time on the accumulation and interaction phases
where they discuss known information with one another.   At the same time,284
they will spend less time on the accommodation and examination phases, where
they evaluate the law and the facts they have heard during to trial in order to
come to a decision.   Giving jurors more information about their task and the285
274. Straus et al., supra note 230, at 136; see also Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus & Leslie A.
DeChurch, Information Sharing and Team Performance:  A Meta-Analysis, 94 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 535, 543 (2009). 
275. Many theorists have characterized groups as information-processing systems.  Christine
B. Gibson, From Knowledge Accumulation to Accommodation:  Cycles of Collective Cognition in
Work Groups, 22 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 121, 123 (2001).
276. Id. at 124.
277. Id. 
278. Id. at 124, 126.
279. Id. at 126.
280. Id. 
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 127.
284. Id.
285. Id.
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various ways they can approach the decisionmaking process can increase
evaluation of the evidence and improve the effectiveness of the decisionmaking
process.286
Juror training in decisionmaking could be standardized and shown to jurors
before they begin deliberations.  One option would be technology-delivered
instruction, including web-based training.   There are various types of web-287
based or computer-based trainings, but one of the most popular is multimedia
training, “in which text, graphics, animation, audio, and video are used through
the computer to facilitate learning.”   Studies have shown that computer-based288
training, especially when supplemented with training strategies, is effective in
increasing user knowledge and performance.   A recent meta-analysis of the289
effectiveness of web-based instruction found that it was as effective as classroom
instruction and may even be more effective in some cases.  290
Furthermore, when groups of people receive training as a group, not only
does performance improve, but participation in the training itself increases jurors’
familiarity with one another, which can also increase cohesion and improve
performance.   Juror training will further maximize the benefits of a diverse291
group of individuals coming together to make an important decision about the
evidence they have learned during the trial.  Jury instructions that simply tell
jurors to “reach an agreement” on the evidence do not provide jurors with the
tools and strategies they need to thoughtfully and efficiently analyze the facts and
law they learn during the trial.  
Specifically, jurors would benefit tremendously from additional training in
effective group decisionmaking strategies and effective group collaboration. 
These strategies would allow jurors to spend more time analyzing the information
and law they have heard about in a trial and less time simply figuring out how to
286. Id. at 128.
287. Aguinis & Kraiger, supra note 6, at 463; see also Bradford S. Bell & Steve W. J.
Kozlowski, Adaptive Guidance:  Enhancing Self-Regulation, Knowledge, and Performance in
Technology-Based Training, 55 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 267, 268 (2002).
288. Michael J. Wesson & Celile Itir Gogus, Shaking Hands With a Computer:  An
Examination of Two Methods of Organizational Newcomer Orientation, 90 J. APP. PSYCHOL. 1018,
1019 (2005).
289. Bell & Kozlowski, supra note 287, at 269, 298 (discussing how supplementing
technology-delivered instruction adaptive guidance—or “training strategy that provides trainees
with diagnostic and interpretive information that helps them make effective learning
decisions”—helps people make better learning decisions and improves performance).  As the
authors noted, “[i]ndividuals who received adaptive guidance displayed higher levels of basic and
strategic knowledge and performance and were also better able to transfer their skills to the more
complex generalization trial.”  Id.
290. Traci Sitzmann, The Comparative Effectiveness of Web-Based and Classroom
Instruction:  A Meta-Analysis, 59 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 623, 640 (2006) (finding that web-based
instruction was six percent more effective than classroom instruction for teaching declarative
knowledge, and that the two methods were equally effective for teaching procedural knowledge). 
291. MORELAND ET AL., supra note 273, at 42.
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approach the information.  Additionally, jurors should be trained in information
sharing, which will ensure that the group discusses all relevant evidence.
Information sharing can also help reduce group conformity and encourage
individual jurors to mention and discuss minority views.  Information sharing will
further help achieve the goal of a truly diverse decisionmaking body.  Finally,
jurors should also be trained in effective decisionmaking procedure, including the
selection of the foreperson.  This process will help encourage more thoughtful
evaluation of the evidence and help reduce the impact that status and social
conformity has on group decisionmaking. 
A.  Training in Decisionmaking
Jurors should be given training in decisionmaking strategies and told to
discuss those strategies before they are asked to reach a decision on the evidence
they have heard during a trial.  Groups often do not discuss their decisionmaking
strategies,  and juries, composed of laypeople with little or no training in legal292
decisionmaking, are no exception.  Moreover, some research suggests that many
groups never discuss strategies unless some group norm is violated.  293
Furthermore, unless they are instructed to discuss decisionmaking strategies,
groups are especially unlikely to do so when it would require them to make
“comparisons about the relative quality of members’ inputs.”   However, when294
groups are told to explicitly consider how they should accomplish their task,
performance improves.   As one author noted, “this is especially true when there295
is no generally accepted procedure for accomplishing the task and when the task
demands a high degree of coordination and information exchange.”296
Furthermore, groups trained in group decisionmaking and group collaboration
perform better than groups without such training.  In one study exhibiting the
positive effects of training on group decisionmaking, researchers had subjects
participate in the Moon Survival task, a problem that is used to measure group
performance on decisionmaking tasks.   It asks group members to imagine that297
they have crash-landed on the moon and are 200 miles from the nearest base.  298
They have fifteen pieces of equipment available to help them and they are asked
to rank them based on how helpful they will be as they walk to safety.   In one299
292. James R. Larson, Discussion of Shared and Unshared Information in Decision-Making
Groups, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 446, 447 (1994).
293. Rebecca A. Henry, Improving Group Judgment Accuracy:  Information Sharing and
Determining the Best Member, 62 ORG. BEHAVAVIOR & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 190, 195
(1995) (citing various studies).
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Larson, supra note 292, at 448.
297. Preston C. Bottger & Phillip W. Yetton, Improving Group Performance by Training in
Individual Problem Solving, 72 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 651, 651 (1987).
298. Id. 
299. Id. at 652.  The “correct” answers to the problem are based on the ranks assigned to the
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study, one group of subjects were asked to solve the problem individually for ten
minutes; each subject was then randomly assigned to the group and the group
spent an additional thirty minutes solving the problem.   In a second group,300
group members heard the problem and then were read a statement that explained
possible threats to good decisionmaking.  301
Subjects were told to make sure they had not misread the instructions or made
unwarranted assumptions.   They were told about the four common ways in302
which people make poor decisions:  hypervigilence (which is characterized by
“frantic searches for quick solutions”), unconflicted adherence (“decision makers
. . . stick with the first idea that comes into their heads, without further evaluation
of its consequences”), unconflicted change (where people “change [their minds]
uncritically and accept the first new idea that comes along”), and defensive
avoidance (which involves delaying a decision, minimizing the importance of the
problem, and ignoring nagging doubts about the decision).   The subjects were303
given strategies for dealing with these common problems and asked to make their
decisions about the items as a group.   The groups that were given guidance304
about the effective use of information produced better solutions than the
uninstructed group.  305
Finally, when groups are trained in decisionmaking strategies, they plan in
advance how they will work on a task, make more “information-vigilant”
comments than untrained groups, and take significantly longer to reach a
decision.   One study found that teams that were given training in effective306
group collaboration—when the team was told to “explicitly explore[] strategies
for coordinating and integrating members’ work”—significantly outperformed
groups that did not receive the training.   Task performance improves with307
training, and if jurors receive even minimal training in decisionmaking strategies
and group collaboration techniques, that training could directly influence the
quality of jury decisionmaking.308
Jurors can be trained to use more effective decisionmaking strategies to reach
a verdict. Jurors should be instructed to discuss how they will approach their
deliberations and told about common pitfalls associated with group
decisionmaking, both of which would help reduce the production losses that
objects by the Crew Equipment Research Unit at the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration.  Id.
300. Id. at 653. 
301. Id.
302. Id.  
303. Id. 
304. Id. at 653-54.
305. Id. at 654. 
306. Larson, supra note 292, at 452.
307. Anita Williams Wooley et al., Bringing in the Experts:  How Team Composition and
Collaborative Planning Jointly Shape Analytic Effectiveness, 39 SMALL GROUP RES. 352, 367
(2008).
308. Henry, supra note 293, at 195-96.
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commonly occur in groups.   This training could be accomplished through web-309
based instruction shown to jurors before the introduction of evidence.  This type
of training can also help jurors recognize the various resources other jurors bring
to the deliberation process.   This training is not an attempt to turn jurors into310
legal experts, but is instead a way to best capture the unique viewpoints and
commonsense approach individual jurors bring to group decisionmaking. 
Training jurors to recognize pitfalls common to all group decisionmaking, and
instructing them to first discuss and then take a structured approach as they
evaluate the evidence they heard during a trial can improve the process of
decisionmaking and encourage a more thorough and evenhanded evaluation of
the evidence.
B.  Training in Information Sharing
In addition to general decisionmaking strategies, juries should be given
additional training in information sharing before they begin deliberations.  When
juries deliberate, they do not necessarily discuss all of the relevant information
and evidence they learned during the trial.  Whether a particular piece of evidence
is discussed by the jury depends on several things:  whether jury members
mention the evidence, whether jury members recall the information, whether they
have the opportunity to mention the evidence, and whether they are motivated to
participate in the discussion.   The jury’s task is an important one, and people311
are more motivated to expend energy to do their best and consider all relevant
information when they believe they are engaged in an important task.   In the312
group setting, however, jurors can be influenced by various group dynamics that
cause them to leave the discussion to other jurors or keep silent about a particular
piece of evidence because they believe it is not the majority view.  Training in
information sharing can help reduce these effects and encourage more thoughtful
decisionmaking in jurors.
Jurors have two main sources of information available to discuss:  shared
information they learn during the trial and unshared information that includes
individual jurors’ preexisting knowledge and experiences.   The concept of313
309. Straus et al., supra note 230, at 139.
310. Wooley et al., supra note 307, at 367.
311. See Larson, supra note 292, at 447 (discussing Strasser & Titus’ “Information Sampling
Model”); Garold Strasser & William Titus, Pooling of Unshared Information in Group Decision
Making:  Biased Information Sampling During Discussion, 48 J. PERSON. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1467
(1985).
312. Id.; see also Sara Gordon, What Jurors Want to Know:  Motivating Juror Cognition to
Increase Legal Knowledge & Improve Decision Making, 81 TENN. L. REV. 751 (2015).  Various
studies suggest that jurors do take their responsibilities very seriously and want to do a good job. 
See, e.g., VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 2, at 245; Ellsworth, supra note 176, at 218.
313. See generally Strasser & Titus, supra note 311, at 1468; see also R. Scott Tindale &
Tatsuya Kameda, ‘Social Sharedness’ as a Unifying Theme for Information Processing in Groups,
3 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 123, 124 (2000).
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shared and unshared information distinguishes group decisionmaking from
individual decisionmaking.  Because they have different backgrounds and
experiences, individual jury members necessarily have different information and
strategies to share with one another and to use in making a decision. 
Furthermore, because they have different life experiences, a diverse group of
jurors will have access to more familiar information—information contributed by
at least one member of the group—and when the group does face unfamiliar
information, a smaller part of that information will be unfamiliar to every member
of the group.  Diverse groups therefore have more time to identify and analyze
that unfamiliar information.  314
When jurors deliberate face-to-face in an unstructured environment where
they are required to reach a consensus, they tend to focus on information that is
shared by all members of the jury and to primarily consider the information that
supports the group’s existing preferences.   Furthermore, studies suggest that315
jurors begin deliberations with at least an initial decision on the verdict and a goal
to quickly reach a decision.   Most studies show that in nine out of ten cases, the316
jury’s vote on the first ballot predicts the outcome of the verdict.   In other317
words, jurors are less likely to share new information or discuss alternative ideas
because they have already made up their minds. 
Furthermore, studies on group decisionmaking suggests “that the information
group members choose to mention during discussion is significantly influenced
by the information that other members have already brought out, by members’
prediscussion preferences, and by status differences within the group.”   Group318
discussion “is rarely a systematic and balanced exploration of the relevant
issues.”   Instead, group members often do not contribute all available319
information and discussion is instead focused on information the group possesses
collectively and information that supports the group’s preexisting preferences.  320
This focus on known information and preexisting preferences can in turn
perpetuate biases that group members bring to the group:  information bias, where
group members spend most of their time discussing information already available
to all members of the group,  and preferential bias, where group members prefer321
alternatives they hear at the beginning of discussion, even if they would not
otherwise prefer those alternatives with more information.  322
Jurors should be instructed to share information and to discuss everything
314. Kristina B. Dahlin, Team Diversity and Information Use, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1107, 1111
(2005).
315. Straus et al., supra note 230, at 132.
316. Maria Sandys & Ronald C. Dillehay, First-Ballot Votes, Predeliberation Dispositions,
and Final Verdicts in Jury Trials, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 175, 188 (1995).
317. Id.
318. Larson, supra note 292, at 446 (citing various studies).
319. Strasser & Titus, supra note 311, at 1467.
320. Straus et al., supra note 230, at 132.
321. Id.
322. Id.
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they think is relevant to the verdict.  This discussion can improve the quality of
jury deliberations.  In one study, groups who were simply told to “list the three
most relevant pieces of information which come up in your discussion of each
question” performed significantly better on a set of quantitative judgment
questions.   Furthermore, in newly-formed groups, strong social norms to be323
pleasant and non-confrontational are likely to exist, and group members may
avoid speaking up to share their own impressions out of fear of violating this
norm.   If jurors are explicitly instructed to share their thoughts and impressions324
of the evidence, the group decision will more fully benefit from the diversity of
experiences individual jurors bring to the group.
Furthermore, jurors should be instructed to discuss the evidence before they
share their individual opinions about the case.  If jurors withhold their individual
preferences until the group has discussed all of the relevant evidence and various
alternatives, information bias and preferential bias will be reduced.   Similarly,325
if jurors are able to separate new idea generation from their actual decision about
the evidence, jurors will be better able to “expand the number of ideas that are
identified and enhance solution quality.”  326
Finally, jury instructions that simply admonish jurors to discuss the evidence
they heard with other jurors should be amended to explicitly recommend that
each juror actively contribute both shared and unshared information to the jury
deliberation.  In order to reduce productivity losses, jurors could be instructed to
use methods that do not require them to take turns.  For example, they could write
their answers down simultaneously and then take turns exchanging those ideas
with the group.  By encouraging jurors to present their opinions simultaneously,
social conformity and confirmation bias will be reduced.   Each juror could then327
be instructed to share her ideas in order to promote involvement and increase
information sharing.  This requirement could make jurors more accountable for
their role in the deliberation process and limit social loafing by individual
jurors.   As Shestowsky & Horowitz note, “instructions that emphasize the role328
that active jury discussion plays in sustaining the legal system may be one way
of increasing personal responsibility and reducing social loafing in the jury
context.”  329
While jurors may bring diverse experiences to bear on their evaluation of the
evidence they hear during a trial, this resource might not be effectively used
323. Henry, supra note 293, at 193.  Examples of questions included, “(a) the year the safety
pin was invented, (b) the coldest temperature ever recorded in Alabama, and (c) per capita beef
consumption in the United States.”  Id. at 192.
324. See infra Part II.C.
325. See supra notes 311-12 and accompanying text; see also Straus et al., supra note 230, at
131. 
326. Straus et al., supra note 230, at 137.
327. See supra Part III.A; see also Straus et al., supra note 230, at 137.
328. See generally Shestowsky & Horowitz, supra note 20, at 333. 
329. Id. at 334.
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without some prompting.  Jurors should be reminded that different members of330
the group may have different perspectives on the evidence and should be
encouraged to consider those perspectives in reaching a group decision.  And
while this training does not need to be extensive, even simple instructions to share
and discuss all information can help maximize the benefits of the jury’s diversity,
which in turn will lead to more thoughtful and effective group decisionmaking.
C.  Training in Procedure
Like decisionmaking strategies and information sharing, the jury’s
decisionmaking procedure can have a significant impact on its decision and juries
should be given training in effective procedural approaches.   Research on juries331
has identified two styles of deliberation:  the “verdict-driven” style, where jurors
conduct a public ballot before any deliberation, and the “evidence” driven style,
where jurors first deliberate before voting.   Many scholars believe that in as332
many as ninety percent of juries, this first vote predicts the jury’s ultimate
decision.   The foreperson often decides which style of deliberation the jury will333
take  and controls speaking time and the order in which other jurors334
participate.   Additionally, the order and form of initial juror opinions can335
influence the votes of other jurors.  Some widely used group voting procedures
330. Henry, supra note 293, at 191.
331. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
332. HASTIE ET AL., supra note 51, at 163.  The “verdict-driven” style has four distinctive
features:  “Deliberation begins with a public ballot.  Individual jurors advocate only one verdict
position at a time.  Evidence is cited in support of a specific verdict position.  And the content of
deliberation contains many statements of verdict preferences and frequent pollings.”  Id.  In
contrast, the “evidence-driven” style has the following characteristics:  
Public balloting occurs only late in deliberation, and in extreme cases, only one ballot
is taken to validate that a quorum has been reached.  Individual jurors are not closely
associated with verdict preferences but may cite testimony or instructions with reference
to several verdicts.  The evidence is reviewed without reference to the verdict
categories, in an effort to agree upon the single most credible story that summarizes the
events at the time of the alleged crime.  And the early parts of deliberation are focused
on the story construction and the review of evidence; not until toward the conclusion
of deliberation does discussion emphasize the task of verdict classification.
Id.
333. Id. at 66 (finding a ninety-one percent accuracy rate of predilberation distribution of juror
verdict preferences and the final verdict when guilty versus not guilty outcomes are the only
consideration); see also Sandys & Dillehay, supra note 316, at 188 (finding “guilty votes on the
first ballot predicted final verdicts in 89% of the cases”).  As Kalven & Zeisel, in their pioneering
book The American Jury, put it, “the deliberation process might well be likened to what the
developer does for an exposed film:  it brings out the picture, but the outcome is predetermined.” 
HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 489 (1971).
334. Devine et al., supra note 19, at 699.
335. Ellison & Munro, supra note 179, at 88.
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are the straw poll, in which jurors vote orally or by show of hands, and the roll-
call vote, in which jurors individually voice their initial votes.   In one study of336
mock jurors, the sequence of initial straw votes had a significant impact on later
voters:  in groups of six mock jurors, the fourth person to vote was heavily
influenced by the previous three votes, especially when those three votes were for
a guilty verdict.  337
Moreover, the timing of jury votes has a significant impact on
decisionmaking.  In the straw-poll study noted above, the fourth-voting jurors
who initially believed the defendant was not guilty were very susceptible to early
straw polls with three previous guilty votes, but they were not influenced when
the straw poll came later in deliberations.   In contrast, jurors inclined to vote338
guilty were about as susceptible to three non-guilty votes but were even more
susceptible when the poll took place later in the deliberations.   The authors339
attribute this difference at least partially to the leniency bias, the “socially (and
legally) preferred error of acquitting the guilty in contrast to convicting the
innocent.”   When votes come after discussion, discussion increases the salience340
of social norms like the leniency bias.341
Jurors should be instructed to use an evidence-driven approach.  Studies have
found that evidence-driven juries reviewed testimony more thoroughly and
considered more carefully the connections between the testimony and the
applicable law.   In contrast, verdict-driven juries spent less time reaching a342
decision  and report themselves and other jurors as less open-minded than juries343
who use an evidence-driven approach.   Furthermore, to minimize the impact344
of status and social conformity, jurors could be instructed to avoid straw-polls
and instead submit anonymous written ballots, which could be collected and
relayed to the jury by the foreperson. 
Finally, jurors could be instructed to think more carefully about the selection
of the foreperson.  Specifically, jurors could be told about how the foreperson is
typically selected and told about the significant role the foreperson will play in
their deliberation.  The foreperson could also be responsible for making sure each
juror speaks before deliberations begin and for focusing jurors’ attention on the
336. James H. Davis et al., Some Social Mechanics of Group Decision Making:  The
Distribution of Opinion, Polling Sequence, and Implications for Consensus, 57 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1000, 1000 (1989).
337. Id.
338. James H. Davis et al., Effects of Straw Polls on Group Decision Making:  Sequential
Voting Pattern, Timing, and Local Majorities, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 918, 921
(1988).
339. Id.
340. Id. at 918. 
341. Id. at 920; see also infra Part II.C.
342. HASTIE ET AL., supra note 51, at 165.
343. Id.  Verdict-driven juries reach a verdict in an average of eighty-three minutes, while
evidence-driven juries deliberate for an average of 131 minutes.  Id.
344. Id.
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process of deliberations, rather than the ultimate verdict.  Studies have found that
leaders who encouraged open discussion and focused on the process of
decisionmaking produced better decisions than those leaders who focused on the
substance of the decisions.   This same leadership style can be incorporated by345
the jury foreperson in order to enhance individual juror participation and improve
the evaluation of evidence by all jury members.
CONCLUSION
One benefit of asking juries to decide verdicts is that the diverse range of
experiences and knowledge in the group should lead to more informed
decisionmaking.  Representative juries composed of laypeople with different
backgrounds and experiences promote accurate fact-finding because such a group
is likely to hold diverse perspectives on the evidence, engage in more thorough
debate, and more closely evaluate the facts.  At the same time, a variety of
problems are associated with group decisionmaking, from loss of motivation in
groups due to social loafing and the free-rider effect, to the vulnerability of
groups to various cognitive biases and errors.  Group dynamics also play a role;
it can be difficult for an individual to stand up to the group when her opinion is
in the minority or when she believes that she has a lower social status than others
in the group.
While jurors may bring diverse experiences to bear on their evaluation of the
evidence they hear during a trial, this resource could be better captured if jurors
were given training on group collaboration and group decisionmaking.  Although
extensive training is not realistic given the time constraints of a typical trial, even
simple training in group decisionmaking, group collaboration, and effective
procedures can dramatically improve performance.  Jurors should be trained in
effective group decisionmaking strategies to ensure thorough discussion of
relevant ideas and information.  Furthermore, jurors should be given strategies to
reduce the tendency for information to be lost and for non-shared information to
remain hidden during deliberations.  Finally, jurors should be trained on effective
and efficient deliberation procedures to encourage deliberation, maximize
participation, and reduce social conformity.  This training will further maximize
the benefits of a diverse group of individuals coming together to make an
important decision about the evidence and the facts they learned during the trial.
345. Straus et al., supra note 230, at 137.
